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1. Introduction
In recent years, many central banks have adopted “inflation targeting” frameworks for the con-
duct of monetary policy. These have proven in a number of countries to be effective means of first
lowering inflation and then maintaining both low and stable inflation and inflation expectations,
without negative consequences for the output gap. Thus, the new approach to monetary policy
has been judged quite successful, as far as its consequences for the average level of inflation and
the output gap are concerned.
It has been less clear how effective these procedures are as ways of bringing about desirable
transitory fluctuations in inflation and output in response to exogenous shocks.1 But this is also a
relevant question in the choice of a framework for the conduct of monetary policy; moreover, the
expectation that inflation targeting procedures will perform well in this respect is often cited
as one of their leading advantages over other approaches to the maintenance of low inflation
and the achievement of credibility. For example, King [16] argues the superiority of inflation
targeting over commitment to a money-growth rule on the ground that, while either approach
should equally serve to maintain low average inflation and low inflation expectations, inflation
targeting also results in optimal short-run responses to shocks, while money-growth targeting
does not. Here we consider how inflation targeting should be conducted in order to achieve this
goal.
1.1. Disadvantages of purely forward-looking policymaking
In King’s analysis, “inflation targeting” is associated with decision-making under discretion.
However, that discretion is constrained by a clear objective, involving inflation stabilization
around the inflation target and output-gap stabilization around an output-gap target. In par-
ticular, the output-gap target is modified (relative to the output gap target that would reflect
true social preferences) to equal zero, so as to be consistent with the natural output level. This
modification of the output-gap target suffices to eliminate the “average inflation bias” associated
with discretionary policymaking, and in the simple Barro-Gordon model that King assumes, this
also suffices to make the outcome of discretionary optimization fully optimal, that is, consis-
tent with the optimal equilibrium under commitment, including optimal responses to transitory
shocks.
However, this result is quite special to the simple model that King uses. As a number of
1 See, for instance, Svensson [36], especially footnote 43.
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authors have pointed out, in the presence of forward-looking private-sector behavior (of the
kind that naturally results from dynamic optimization by the private sector), discretionary
optimization by a central bank generally results not only in average inflation bias, when the
output-gap target is positive, but also in inefficient responses to shocks (what is sometimes
called “stabilization bias”), regardless of whether the output-gap target is positive or not.2
The reason is simple. In general, forward-looking behavior implies that the bank’s short-run
tradeoffs (between, say, its inflation stabilization and output-gap stabilization) following a shock
can be improved if it can be arranged for private-sector expectations about future inflation and
output to adjust in the right way in response to the shock. However, this can occur–when
the private sector has rational expectations–only if subsequent central bank policy does in fact
change as a result of the past shocks, in such a way as to bring about the alternative evolution
that it was desired that people would expect. But under discretionary optimization, it will
not, as the central bank will re-optimize afresh at the later date, and care nothing about past
conditions that no longer constrain what it is possible for it to achieve at that date. This problem
can exist, and generally does, even when the output-gap target is consistent with steady inflation
at the inflation target so that there is no average inflation bias.
As Woodford [45] stresses, the suboptimal responses to shocks characteristic of discretionary
optimization also characterize any decision procedure for monetary policy that is purely forward-
looking. By a purely forward-looking procedure we mean one in which only factors that matter
for the central bank’s forecast of the future evolution of its target variables, conditional upon
its current and future policy actions, play any role in its decisions. Any such procedure has
the property that, if it determines a unique equilibrium, that equilibrium is one in which the
evolution of the target variables depends only upon the factors just mentioned. In particular, the
equilibrium paths of the target variables will be independent of past conditions that no longer
matter for current equilibrium determination except insofar as the central bank may condition its
policy upon them. But, as Woodford [44] emphasizes, in general forward-looking private-sector
behavior implies that an optimal equilibrium will involve additional history-dependence. This is
because it is optimal for the path of the target variables to depend upon past conditions–even
2 Jonsson [12] and Svensson [34] point out that stabilization bias and conditional inflation bias, as distinct from
average inflation bias, arises in a Barro-Gordon model with output persistence, that is, with an endogenous state
variable. Flode´n [9], Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler [4] and Woodford [44] show that stabilization bias arises with a
Calvo-type forward-looking Phillips curve. The problem goes beyond a mere contemporaneous response to shocks
of the wrong size. Instead, as stressed by Woodford [44] and [45], discretionary optimization also generally leads to
a suboptimal degree of persistence of the effects of shocks as well–the problem of inadequate history-dependence
discussed below.
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when these no longer constrain currently feasible outcomes–because of the effects of the prior
anticipation of such dependence upon the path of the target variables at earlier dates.3
Purely forward-looking approaches to monetary policy are also more easily prone to another
problem, which is indeterminacy of rational-expectations equilibrium. Most inflation-targeting
central banks (as, indeed, most central banks nowadays) use a short-term nominal interest rate
as the policy instrument or “operating target”. But as Sargent and Wallace [30] first stressed,
interest-rate rules may allow a large multiplicity of rational-expectations equilibrium paths for
real and nominal variables, including equilibria in which fluctuations occur that are unrelated to
any variation in economic “fundamentals”. This indeterminacy is plainly undesirable–at least
if alternative policy rules are available, that are equally consistent with the best equilibrium,
but do not allow the bad ones–since some of the possible equilibria will be very bad, from the
point of view of any objective that penalizes unnecessary variation in the target variables.4
In the case of many forward-looking models derived from private-sector optimization, as with
the rational-expectations IS-LM model analyzed by Sargent and Wallace [30], one can show
that commitment to any reaction function that determines the path of the nominal interest
rate purely as a function of exogenous factors (that is, without any feedback from endogenous
variables such as the rate of inflation) implies indeterminacy of the equilibrium price level.5
However, this does not mean that interest-rate-setting procedures as such must lead to this
outcome; as McCallum [22] first noted, a sufficient degree of dependence (of the right sort) of the
central bank’s interest-rate operating target upon endogenous variables can render equilibrium
determinate, in the sense of there existing a unique non-explosive solution to the equilibrium
conditions. It is important, though, to choose an interest-rate-setting procedure that involves
sufficient dependence of this kind.
One example of the kind of dependence that suffices for determinacy in the simple forward-
looking model used below is that assumed in the well-known reaction function proposed by
Taylor [40]: making the nominal interest rate an increasing function of the observed inflation
and output gap, with a positive coefficient on the output gap and a coefficient greater than
one on inflation. This sort of reaction function has also been found to lead to a determinate
3 The history-dependence of equilibria resulting from optimal policy under commitment in the case of a
forward-looking system has been observed since the early treatments by, for instance, Backus and Driffill [1] and
Currie and Levine [7].
4 This criterion for choice among alternative monetary-policy reaction functions is also stressed in Bernanke
and Woodford [2], Christiano and Gust [5], Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler [3], Kerr and King [14], Rotemberg and
Woodford [28], and Woodford [44] and [47, chapter 4].
5 See Woodford [44] for a result of this kind in the context of a model closely related to that used here.
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equilibrium in a variety of other types of forward-looking models.6
The kind of dependence that is needed for determinacy may not be possible in the case
of a purely forward-looking procedure of the kind often assumed in discussions of inflation-
forecast targeting. To make this point in an especially sharp way, we here consider a simple
forward-looking model in which no lagged endogenous variables matter for the determination of
future inflation and output. In this case, a purely forward-looking monetary-policy procedure–
by which (in line with Woodford [46] and Giannoni and Woodford [11]) we mean one under
which the decision at each point in time depends only on the set of possible future paths for the
economy, given its current condition–must make the central bank’s instrument choice a function
solely of information about the future evolution of the exogenous disturbances. Under the further
assumptions that (i) all information about the exogenous disturbances that is available to the
private sector is also directly observed by the central bank, and (ii) the central bank must choose
its current instrument setting before observing the private sector’s current choices of endogenous
variables and its current expectations, this means that the nominal interest rate will evolve solely
as a function of exogenous state variables, independent of the paths of any of the endogenous
variables. But such a rule implies indeterminacy of the equilibrium paths of both inflation and
output.7
Thus, we conclude once again that a decision procedure that can be relied upon to achieve
the optimal equilibrium under commitment must be history-dependent in a way that purely
discretionary decision-making procedures are not, as well as insure determinacy of the equilib-
rium. Our task in this paper is to consider to what extent various alternative forms of inflation
targeting can avoid stabilization bias, incorporate history-dependence of the proper sort and
result in determinacy of the equilibrium.
6 See Christiano and Gust [5], Levin, Wieland and Williams [21], Rotemberg and Woodford [28], and Woodford
[44].
7 Studies such as Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler [3], and Woodford [47, chapter 4], find that equilibrium may be
determinate, in a forward-looking model closely related to our own, under commitment to a rule that makes
the nominal interest rate a sufficiently sharply increasing function of current and/or expected future inflation
and output gaps over some horizon. But their result is obtained by assuming that the desired relation between
expected inflation and output and the nominal interest rate can be imposed as an equilibrium condition: the
bank’s ability to ensure that it necessarily holds in equilibrium is not questioned. Such a condition, however, is an
implicit instrument rule and does not represent a fully operational specification of the monetary policy rule, as the
central bank’s instrument is expressed as a function of endogenous variables (conditional expectations of future
inflation and output) that themselves depend upon current monetary policy. In practice, the bank would have
to forecast the paths of the endogenous variables, given its contemplated action. If this forecast depends only on
information about the exogenous disturbances and the bank’s contemplated policy, then an operational version of
the policy rule, an explicit instrument rule, in which the bank’s decision procedure is completely specified as an
algorithm, is equivalent to a rule that sets the nominal interest rate as a function of the exogenous disturbances,
and leads to indeterminacy.
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1.2. Monetary-policy rules and approaches to policy implementation
Since we will discuss the details of alternative decision frameworks for monetary policy, it is
practical to have a consistent classification of such decision frameworks. In this paper, as in
Svensson [36] and [38], a “monetary-policy rule” is interpreted broadly as a “prescribed guide
for monetary-policy conduct.” We give particular attention to a special type of policy rules,
that we call “targeting rules.” “Target variables” are endogenous variables that enter a loss
function, a function that is increasing in the deviations of the target variables from prescribed
“target levels.” “Targeting” is minimizing such a loss function. “Forecast targeting” refers to
using forecasts of the target variables effectively as intermediate target variables, as in King’s
[15] early characterization of inflation targeting.
A “general targeting rule” is a high-level specification of a monetary-policy rule that specifies
the target variables, the target levels and the loss function to be minimized. A complete de-
scription of such a procedure also requires specification of the exact procedure used to determine
the actions that should minimize the loss function, such as the one that we propose in section 3
below.
A “specific targeting rule” is instead expressed directly as a condition for the target variables,
a “target criterion.” Under certain circumstances, commitment to a general targeting rule may
be equivalent to a particular specific targeting rule, which describes conditions that the forecast
paths must satisfy in order to minimize a particular loss function. Nonetheless, it may be
important to distinguish between the two ways of describing the policy commitment, on grounds
either of differing efficiency as means of communicating with the public, or of differing degrees
of robustness to changes in the model of the economy used to implement them. Furthermore,
a specific targeting rule need not be equivalent to any intuitive general targeting rule,8 and
indeed one of our primary reasons for interest in such specifications here will be their greater
flexibility, making it easier to introduce history-dependence of the sort required to solve the
problems introduced in the previous section.
Any policy rule implies a “reaction function,” that specifies the central bank’s instrument as
a function of predetermined endogenous or exogenous variables observable to the central bank at
the time that it sets the instrument. This “implied reaction function” should not, in general, be
confused with the policy rule itself; for example, the implied reaction function associated with a
8 One can always find a trivial general targeting rule for any specific targeting rule by simply letting the loss
function be the square of the specific targeting rule written as a target criterion equal to zero.
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given policy rule will generally change in the case of changes in the model of the economy used
in implementing the rule. However, an “explicit instrument rule” is a low-level specification of
the monetary-policy rule, in the form of a prescribed reaction function. Proposals such as the
policy rule advocated by Taylor [40] are of this form.
We are interested in decision procedures for monetary policy that can achieve (or at least
come close to) the optimal equilibrium under commitment. In fact, there is no single policy rule
that is uniquely consistent with the optimal equilibrium. Many rules may be consistent with
the same equilibrium, even though they are not equivalent insofar as they imply a commitment
to different sorts of out-of-equilibrium behavior. Furthermore, even rules that specify the same
actions in all circumstances, given a particular model of the economy, may deserve separate
consideration because they would no longer be equivalent if the bank’s model of the economy
were to change.
We shall not here attempt to enumerate all of the possible types of policy rules that could
achieve the optimal equilibrium. Instead, we shall seek approaches to this problem that pre-
serve, to the greatest extent possible, the attractive features of “inflation-forecast targeting,” the
procedure currently used (in one variant or another) by the most prominent inflation-targeting
central banks.9 For example, we shall prefer approaches in which the decision process has as
transparent a connection as possible with the central bank’s ultimate objectives. A proce-
dure like inflation-forecast targeting, in which the entire decision process is organized around
the pursuit of an explicit objective defined in terms of the ultimate goal variables, has several
advantages. Focus upon such an objective helps to ensure that policy is made in a coherent
fashion; it facilitates communication with the public about the intended consequences of the
bank’s policy, even when the full details of the implementation of the policy may be too com-
plex to describe; and it favors accountability by indicating the way in which the policy’s success
can appropriately be measured. We shall inquire as to the extent to which we can preserve this
sort of transparency while introducing the sort of history-dependence required for a determinate
equilibrium with optimal responses to shocks.
Another criterion for a good policy rule is robustness of the rule specification to possible
changes in the details of the bank’s model of the economy. A full analysis of the question
of robustness would necessarily be numerical, as in general one cannot expect any rule to be
completely unaffected by possible model changes, and the question will be which kinds of rules
9 See, for instance, Svensson [33], [36] and [38] for discussion of procedures of this general type.
6
are less affected. Nonetheless, we here consider robustness of a somewhat special kind, which is
the possibility that a rule may continue to be optimal under some particular (restricted) class of
perturbations of the model. On this ground, we shall consider a policy rule better if it continues
to be optimal under a larger class of perturbations than is true for another rule.
This, too, is a desirable feature of inflation-forecast targeting proposals. These tend to be
high-level specifications of monetary policy, with the details of implementation depending upon
the details of the particular model of the economy used by a particular central bank. In some
cases, changes in the model require no change in the high-level description of optimal policy. For
example, Svensson [33] and [38] show how a targeting rule defined in terms of desired features
of the forecast paths for inflation and the output gap may correspond to a first-order condition
that characterizes the optimal equilibrium. An advantage of this way of describing the optimal
equilibrium is that the form of the first-order condition is invariant under certain changes in the
model, notably changes in the assumed character of (additive) stochastic disturbances. Here
we shall give attention to policy specifications that share this property, though they involve
history-dependence sufficient to eliminate the problems just mentioned with purely forward-
looking procedures.10
With these desiderata in mind, we explore the possibility of implementing the optimal equi-
librium in each of three possible ways. Our highest-level policy specification is in terms of a
general targeting rule, a loss function that the central bank is committed to seeking to minimize,
through a forecast-based dynamic optimization procedure. In the case of this way of specifying
policy, the history-dependence necessary for optimality must be introduced through a modifica-
tion of the central bank’s loss function, that must be made history-dependent in a way that the
true (social) loss function is not.
Our second, intermediate-level policy specification is in terms of a specific targeting rule,
specifying a criterion that the bank’s forecast paths for its target variables must satisfy. This
kind of rule specifies a relation involving one or more endogenous variables that cannot be directly
observed at the time that policy is chosen, and that instead must be forecasted. Furthermore, in
the case of a forward-looking model, even forecasting endogenous variables a short time in the
future will in general require solving for the model’s equilibrium into the indefinite future; thus
a forecast of the entire future paths of the various variables is required. A decision procedure
of this kind is therefore still organized around the construction of forecast paths conditional
10 In Svensson [33], problems of stabilization bias and lack of history-dependence do not arise, owing to the
absence of forward-looking elements in the simple model used to expound the idea.
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upon alternative policies, even if explicit optimization is not undertaken. In the case of such
a targeting rule, the history-dependence necessary for determinacy and optimality must be
introduced through commitment to a rule that involves lagged endogenous variables as well as
forecasts of their future values.
Finally, our lowest-level specification of policy is in terms of an explicit instrument rule, spec-
ifying the setting of the central bank’s instrument as a function of variables that are exogenous
or predetermined at the time. Implementation of this kind of policy rule is no longer dependent
upon either a model of the economy or an explicit objective function. We find that such rules
are less transparently related to the ultimate objectives of policy than in the other two cases,
also when we consider the possibility of instrument rules that are relatively robust to changes
in model specification, owing to their derivation from first-order conditions that characterize
the optimal equilibrium. Such rules also differ from the other two cases in that they are purely
backward-looking; as a result, introduction of the dependence upon lagged endogenous variables
required for determinacy and optimality is straightforward.
Our analysis leads us to more than one example of a policy rule that both renders equilibrium
determinate and achieves the optimal equilibrium, if the central bank’s commitment to it can
be made credible to the private sector. These include history-dependent variants of inflation-
forecast targeting. We thus conclude that the need for history-dependence in policy, for the
reasons just sketched, is consistent with a suitably designed forecast-targeting procedure.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a simple forward-looking
model that allows us to make the above remarks more concrete. We characterize the optimal
equilibrium in such a model, and show that it involves history-dependence of a kind not consistent
with purely discretionary decisionmaking. We also show that the problem of indeterminacy of
equilibrium arises in this model and needs to be considered in the specification of the different
policy rules.
In sections 3, 4 and 5, we then take up the three successively lower-level specifications of
policy described above. In each case, we consider ways in which the sort of history-dependence
in policy required for consistency with the optimal equilibrium can be introduced. We also treat
the issue of determinacy of equilibrium for each of the policies analyzed. Finally, in section 6,
we compare the advantages and disadvantages of the various proposals taken up in the previous
sections. Here we also briefly discuss the transparency of the connection to policy goals and the
robustness of our various policy specifications. We conclude that a variant of inflation-forecast
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targeting, modified to include a commitment by the central bank to respond to deviations
of private-sector expectations from those it had forecasted, represents an especially attractive
procedure from the point of view of these several criteria.
2. The model
The model is a variant of a standard forward-looking model used, for example, in Clarida, Gal´ı
and Gertler [4] and Woodford [44] and [47]. In the variant that we use here, inflation and
output are both predetermined for one period, as in Bernanke and Woodford [2], Rotemberg
and Woodford [27] and [28], and Svensson [38], except for an unforecastable random error term
that cannot be affected by monetary policy. Optimizing private-sector behavior is represented
by two structural equations, an aggregate-supply equation (derived from a first-order condition
for optimal price-setting by the representative supplier) and an “expectational IS curve” (derived
from an Euler equation for the optimal timing of purchases).11
The forward-looking aggregate-supply (AS) equation takes the form
πt+1 = βπt+2|t + κxt+1|t + ut+1, (2.1)
where πt+1 is inflation between periods t and t+1 (also referred to as inflation in period t+1),
xt is the output gap, indicating the percentage by which output exceeds potential, 0 < β < 1
is a discount factor, κ is a positive coefficient, and ut+1 is an exogenous disturbance term, the
value of which is realized only in period t+1.12 For any variable z and any horizon τ ≥ 0, we use
the notation zt+τ |t ≡ Etzt+τ to denote private-sector expectations regarding zt+τ conditional on
information available in period t; for example, πt+2|t denotes private-sector inflation expectations
in period t of inflation between periods t + 1 and t + 2. This variant of the Calvo-Rotemberg
aggregate-supply relation differs from that used, for example, in Woodford [44] in that the
conditional expectations of xt+1 and πt+2 are taken in period t rather than t + 1. This is
because, except for the surprise component ut+1 − ut+1|t, we assume that prices are determined
one period in advance. As a result of this decision lag, the first-order condition for “voluntary”
11 See Woodford [47] for general discussion of the microeconomic foundations of the class of models to which
ours belongs.
12 Here we assume, as in standard expositions of the Calvo pricing model, that prices remain fixed in monetary
terms between the occasions on which they are re-optimized. It is worth noting, however, that if we were to
assume a constant rate of increase in prices between the occasions on which prices are re-optimized, as in Yun
[48], the aggregate-supply relation would take the same form, but with πt+1 interpreted as inflation in excess of
that “normal” rate. Our conclusions below as to the character of optimal policy would also all have direct analogs
in that case, allowing for the possibility of optimal targeting rules in which the inflation target could differ from
zero.
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price changes is the same as in the simpler case, but conditioned upon an earlier information
set. This has the consequence that, as is often assumed, monetary policy changes will have no
effect upon inflation within the period in which the change first becomes public. We assume
that measured inflation differs from the average of “voluntary” price changes by an error term
that need not be forecastable when the “voluntary” price changes are determined; this might be
interpreted either as measurement error in the price index, or as a time-varying markup of retail
prices over the predetermined wholesale prices.13 We allow for the existence of a “surprise”
component of inflation in order to avoid the counterfactual implication that inflation is known
with perfect certainty one period in advance.
Our specification also differs from the simplest one in that we allow for a forecastable “cost-
push” shock ut+1|t, which shifts the distance between “potential output” (with respect to which
our “output gap” is defined) and the level of output that would be consistent with zero “vol-
untary” inflation. Thus, we assume that some exogenous shifts in the aggregate supply curve
do not correspond to changes in the efficient level of output (an example would be exogenous
variation in the markup over wholesale prices); these shifts are not considered to represent vari-
ation in “potential output” (so that the social loss function can still be expressed in terms of our
output-gap variable), and thus appear as a residual in (2.1). Allowance for such a shock creates
a conflict between inflation stabilization and output-gap stabilization, so that optimal policy
does not take the relatively trivial form of completely stabilizing the predictable components of
both variables. A special case is when the cost-push disturbance is an AR(1) process,
ut+1 = ρut + εt+1, (2.2)
where 0 ≤ ρ < 1 and εt+1 is an exogenous iid shock.14
The forward-looking aggregate-demand (IS) equation takes the form
xt+1 = xt+2|t − σ(it+1|t − πt+2|t − rnt+1), (2.3)
where it, the “instrument rate,” is a short nominal interest rate and the central bank’s instru-
ment, σ is a positive coefficient (the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), and rnt+1 is an
13 Which interpretation we take has no consequences for our analysis of optimal policy, since the surprise
component of inflation makes in any event only an exogenous and constant contribution to the expected losses
computed below.
14 Here we assume that the same shock εt+1 represents both the surprise component of inflation in period t+1
and the innovation in period t + 1 in the distortion ut+2|t+1 that affects “voluntary” inflation in period t + 2.
These could be the same process, if, for example, both are due to exogenous variation in the retail markup. More
generally, however, all that really matters for our subsequent analysis is that the forecastable component ut+1|t is
assumed to be an AR(1) process. Allowing a “surprise inflation” term that is independent of this process makes
no difference for our conclusions.
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exogenous disturbance. Again, conditional expectations are taken one period earlier than in the
standard Euler equation, because interest-sensitive private expenditure is assumed to be prede-
termined for one period. This “time to plan” (argued in Christiano and Vigfusson [6] and Edge
[8] to be realistic at least in the case of investment spending) is included in order to obtain the
implication that monetary policy changes have no effect upon output, either, during the period
of the change. Again, we allow for a “surprise” component of output, which may be interpreted
as exogenous variation in some other component of aggregate expenditure, such as government
purchases, that are not predetermined.
The forecastable component of the disturbance process, rn
t+1|t, represents exogenous variation
in the Wicksellian “natural” (real) rate of interest, the real interest rate consistent with a
zero output gap. This represents a composite of disturbances that affect the desired timing of
expenditure and disturbances that affect potential output, since our IS equation is written in
terms of the output gap rather than output.15 As long as our stabilization objectives can be
defined in terms of inflation and the output gap (rather than output directly), only the effect of
such factors upon the natural rate of interest matters for our analysis. A special case is when
the natural rate of interest is an AR(1) process,
rnt+1 = r¯ + ω(r
n
t − r¯) + ηt+1, (2.4)
where 0 ≤ ω < 1, r¯ is the average natural real rate and ηt+1 is an exogenous iid shock in period
t+ 1.16
The inclusion of the decision lags in our structural relations implies that inflation and the
output gap fulfill
πt+1 = πt+1|t + ut+1 − ut+1|t, (2.5)
xt+1 = xt+1|t + σ(rnt+1 − rnt+1|t), (2.6)
so that both inflation and the output gap are determined one period in advance, up to “surprise”
terms that are completely exogenous. Thus, policy should be aimed solely at influencing the
evolution of the forecastable components of inflation and the output gap, the private sector’s
inflation and output-gap “plans”, πt+1|t and xt+1|t. Thus, taking the expectation in period t
of (2.1) and (2.3), we can interpret them as describing how private-sector plans in period t for
15 See Woodford [47, chapter 4], for discussion of how various types of real disturbances affect this variable.
16 Once again, it does not necessarily make sense to equate the “surprise” component of the output gap with
the innovation in the natural rate, but this notational economy does not affect any of our subsequent conclusions.
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inflation and the output gap in period t+1, πt+1|t and xt+1|t, are determined by expectations of:
(1) inflation and the output gap in period t+2, πt+2|t and xt+2|t, (2) the interest rate in period
t+1, it+1|t, and (3) the cost-push shock and natural interest rate in period t+1, ut+1|t and rnt+1|t.
This modification of the basic model thus emphasizes, in equation (2.3), that monetary policy
affects the economy not through the value set for the current short interest rate but rather by
the expectations created regarding future interest rates.17 Actual inflation and the output gap
in period t+ 1 are then determined by (2.5) and (2.6).
It follows from this last observation that there is no reason for surprise variations in the
short-term interest rate to ever be chosen by the central bank. Such surprises can have no
advantages in terms of improved stabilization of inflation or output, and if there is even a
tiny degree of preference for less interest-rate variability (for reasons such as those discussed
in Woodford [47, chapter 6]), it will therefore be optimal to make the interest rate perfectly
forecastable one period in advance. We shall therefore restrict our attention to decision-making
procedures under which the central bank’s instrument is predetermined. One way to ensure this
is for the central bank to make a decision in period t, denoted it+1,t, regarding the interest rate
to be set in period t + 1; several of the policy frameworks considered below incorporate this
feature. This illustrates the more general point that a desirable decisionmaking framework may
require the bank to decide, during the period-t decision cycle, about matters in addition to the
current setting of its instrument it.





the expected value of the sum of discounted future period losses, starting in an arbitrary initial
period t0. (The question of the information with respect to which it is appropriate to condition
in evaluating alternative policies is considered below.) The period losses are given by a period




[π2t + λ(xt − x∗)2], (2.8)
where λ is the nonnegative relative weight on output-gap stabilization, and x∗ is the socially
optimal output gap (for simplicity assumed constant), which is positive if potential output on
17 This is also largely the case in the standard model, as is emphasized in Rotemberg and Woodford [28] and
Woodford [44], since expected future interest rates enter indirectly via the expectations of future inflation and
output gaps that enter equations (2.1) and (2.3).
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average, due to some distortion, falls short of the socially optimal output level.18 The discount
factor β in (2.7) is assumed to be the same as the coefficient appearing in (2.1). Woodford [47,
chapter 6], shows that this form of loss function can be derived as a quadratic approximation
to the (negative of) expected utility of the representative household in the same optimizing
sticky-price model as is used to derive structural relations (2.1) and (2.3). And apart from this,
it is a commonly assumed representation of the objectives of a central bank engaged in “flexible
inflation targeting” (for instance, King [16] and Svensson [36]).
We assume that the private sector and the central bank have the same information. Specif-
ically, we assume that both observe the current realization ut in period t, and have the same
information in period t about the future evolution of the exogenous disturbances; thus, for exam-
ple, the private sector’s conditional expectation ut+τ |t, regarding any period τ > 0, is assumed
to also be the expectation regarding that exogenous variable conditional upon the central bank’s
information during its period-t decision cycle. We also assume that any random element in the
central bank’s period-t decisions is revealed to the private sector in period t. The only asym-
metry is that in our discussion of specific central bank decision procedures, we assume that the
central bank makes its period-t decisions (such as its commitment it+1,t) without being able to
observe the values of period-t forward-looking variables, such as private-sector plans πt+1|t and
xt+1|t. This allows us to avoid the circularity of supposing that the central bank can directly
respond in period t to forward-looking variables that themselves depend upon the central bank’s
period-t decisions. However, in a rational-expectations equilibrium, the period-t forward-looking
variables will be functions of the current values of predetermined and exogenous variables (about
which the bank and the private sector have the same information), and thus the bank has suffi-
cient information to allow it to perfectly forecast the period-t variables that it does not directly
observe. We also compute the equilibria associated with alternative central-bank decision pro-
cedures on the assumption that these procedures are perfectly understood by the private sector;
this includes a correct understanding by the private sector of the central bank’s model of the
economy, insofar as this model is used in the bank’s decisions. When the bank’s model matters,
we assume that it is the same as the true model of the economy (described by equations (2.1)
and (2.3) and the stochastic processes governing the exogenous disturbances, (2.2) and (2.4) in
the special case), which is to say, the model with which private-sector expectations are assumed
18 Note that time variation in the optimal output gap has been allowed for by the inclusion of the “cost-push”
disturbance term in (2.1). Following prior literature, we separately consider the consequences of a non-zero mean
distortion and the consequences of random variation in the distortion.
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to be consistent.
The model assumed here, while familiar, has some features that are worthy of comment.
Both the AS and IS equations incorporate important forward-looking elements. In particular,
the tradeoff that the central bank faces in period t between alternative values for the forecastable
components of inflation and the output gap in period t + 1 (πt+1|t and xt+1|t respectively)
depends upon private-sector expectations regarding equilibrium in still later periods (due to the
πt+2|t term in (2.1), and hence upon expectations regarding future policy. This gives rise to
a “conditional” or “stabilization bias” in the responses to shocks resulting from discretionary
optimization, as we show explicitly below.
Indeed, our simple model is extremely forward-looking, in that the equations that determine
πt+τ |t and xt+τ |t for all τ > 0 involve no other variables, except period-t expectations regarding
future central bank actions it+τ |t and regarding the evolution of the exogenous disturbances
ut+τ |t, rnt+τ |t. This means a purely forward-looking decision procedure for monetary policy–one
that depends simply upon the central bank’s forecasts in period t of the future evolution of its
target variables–will result in period-t decisions that depend only upon period-t expectations
regarding the evolution of the exogenous disturbances, and not upon any current or lagged
endogenous variables at all.19
This feature of our model is undoubtedly highly special, but it allows us to contrast the
history-dependence that is required in order to implement optimal policy with the results of
purely forward-looking procedures in an especially sharp way. In a more realistic model, many
sorts of intrinsic dynamics would also likely be present, as a result of which lagged endogenous
variables would matter for conditional forecasts of the future evolution of the target variables.
But our general points about the generic inefficiency of purely forward-looking procedures would
remain valid; the quantitative significance of the inefficiency in more complex, but more realistic,
models remains a topic for future research.
19 An advantage of our allowance for one-period decision lags in both spending and pricing decisions is that
feedback from even the current quarter’s inflation rate and output gap, as in the rule proposed by Taylor [40], is
here clearly an example of dependence upon variables that are irrelevant under a purely forward-looking procedure.
This allows us a sharp contrast between purely prospective procedures, such as those often recommended in the
literature on inflation targeting, and purely backward-looking rules such as the “Taylor rule.” We believe that this
feature of our model is quite realistic (assuming the “period” to be a typical length of time between central bank
decision cycles), and thus worth the minor complication involved. In fact, inflation and output may be largely
predetermined for significantly longer periods of time.
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2.1. Optimal equilibrium responses to shocks
By an equilibrium of this model, we mean a triple of stochastic processes for inflation, the
output gap and the interest rate that satisfy equations (2.1) and (2.3). Note that our concept of
“equilibrium” does not include any assumption that the central bank behaves optimally, as our
task is in fact to investigate the equilibria associated with alternative candidate policy-making
procedures on the part of the central bank.
We first consider the equilibrium from some period t0 onward that is optimal in the sense of
minimizing (2.7). In this calculation, the expectation is conditional upon the state of the world
in period t0, denoted Et0 , when we imagine being able to choose among equilibria that remain
possible from that period onward. Let us call this “t0-optimality”; it corresponds to the type of
optimal plan with which the literature on dynamic Ramsey taxation, for example, is typically
concerned. (We shall subsequently also define optimality from a “timeless perspective” that we
shall argue is more appropriate when choosing among policy rules.)
We begin by observing that, conditional upon information available one period in advance,






t+1|t + λ(xt+1|t − x∗)2] +
1
2






t+1|t + λ(xt+1|t − x∗)2] +
1
2
Et[(ut+1 − ut+1|t)2 + λσ2(rnt+1 − rnt+1|t)2],
using (2.5) and (2.6). The second term on the right-hand side of the second line is independent
of policy, as it depends only upon the exogenous disturbance processes. Thus (using also the fact
that Et0Lt+1 = Et0 [EtLt+1] for all t ≥ t0), we may replace each term of the form Et0Lt+1 in (2.7)
by the conditional expectation of the first term on the right-hand side above, plus a positive
constant. Since the initial term Et0Lt0 is also independent of policy (given predetermined initial
values for πt0|t0−1 and xt0|t0−1), our problem may equivalently be defined as that of choosing
paths for the forecastable components of inflation and the output gap, the private-sector one-









π2t+1|t + λ(xt+1|t − x∗)2
i
.
Note that once we have determined the optimal paths for the forecastable components, we shall
have determined the optimal paths for inflation and the output gap as well, because of (2.5) and
(2.6).
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We thus need ask only what constraints the equilibrium relations (2.1) and (2.3) impose upon
the possible paths of the forecastable components of these two variables. One such constraint is
πt+1|t = βπt+2|t + κxt+1|t + ut+1|t, (2.9)
obtained by taking the conditional expectation of (2.1) one period in advance. This is in fact
the only constraint. For given any processes for the forecastable components satisfying (2.9),
the inflation processes implied by (2.5) then necessarily satisfies (2.1); and given any processes
for inflation and the output gap, one can solve (2.3) for a forecastable interest-rate process
{it+1|t}∞t=t0 that satisfies that condition as well.











t+1|t + λ(xt+1|t − x∗)2]




where Ξt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (2.9).20 We note that Ξt+1
depends on period-t information only. Differentiating with respect to πt+1|t and xt+1|t for any
t ≥ t0 gives the first-order conditions
πt+1|t − Ξt+1 + Ξt = 0, (2.11)
λ(xt+1|t − x∗) + κΞt+1 = 0, (2.12)
for all t ≥ t0, with the initial condition
Ξt0 = 0. (2.13)




(xt+1|t − xt|t−1) = 0 (2.14)




(xt+1|t − x∗) = 0 (2.15)
for t = t0.
In order to determine the stochastic processes for πt+1|t and xt+1|t, we use (2.14) and (2.15)
to eliminate πt+1|t and πt+2|t in (2.9). For λ > 0, this yields a second-order difference equation
for xt+1|t for t ≥ t0,







20 Relative to the formulation in Woodford [45], the Lagrange multiplier is defined with the opposite sign, so
as to be interpreted as marginal losses rather than gains.
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where






and (2.13) and (2.15) give rise to an initial condition,
xt0|t0−1 ≡ x
∗, (2.18)
where we emphasize that the notation xt0|t0−1 is here temporarily used only to introduce the
initial condition (2.18) in (2.16), corresponding to the initial condition (2.13), rather than to
denote the one-period-ahead output-gap plan in period t0 − 1. The characteristic equation,
µ2 − 2aµ+ 1
β
= 0, (2.19)
has two roots (eigenvalues of the dynamic system), c ≡ a −
p
a2 − 1/β and 1/(βc), such that







(βc)jut+1+j|t + cxt|t−1 (2.20)
for t ≥ t0.
Under the assumption (2.2), the term
P∞
j=0(βc)















where the last step uses (2.18). Given this solution for xt+1|t, we can then use (2.14) to find



















again simplifying by assuming (2.2).






to (2.14) and (2.15). Since c→ 0 when λ→ 0, this can be shown to be the limit of (2.21)—(2.24).
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2.2. Optimality from a “timeless perspective”
This equilibrium, however, specifies inflation and output-gap processes that depend upon how
long it has been since the period t0 in which the “t0-optimal” equilibrium was chosen. Obviously,
exactly the same criterion would lead one to choose a different equilibrium in some later period,
rather than the continuation of the equilibrium chosen as optimal in period t0. This is just the
familiar problem of time-inconsistency of optimal plans in problems of this kind, first identified
by Kydland and Prescott [18]. Formally, it results from the fact that initial condition (2.13) is
specified for period t0, though the solution generally involves Ξt 6= 0 in later periods.
What this means, intuitively, is that the proposed criterion for optimality allows one to select
an equilibrium from period t0 onward that exploits the fact that private-sector expectations in
earlier periods are already given when the paths from t0 onward are chosen. This allows one to
choose a “surprise” inflation for “just this once” while committing never to do so again, as one
would suffer all of the consequences of anticipated inflation if one chose an equilibrium in which
inflation is planned for a period well after t0. Of course, if one allows oneself to exploit pre-
existing expectations in this way, it would be equally appealing to allow “one last unexpected
inflation” in some later period as well. This is the reason for the time-inconsistency of optimal
policy in this sense.
It therefore makes sense not to demand of a monetary policy rule that commitment to it from
some date t0 onward be expected to implement an equilibrium that is “t0-optimal”. Instead,
we consider optimality from the “timeless perspective” recommended by Woodford [45] and
Giannoni and Woodford [11]. A policy rule is optimal from a timeless perspective if (i) it has
a time-invariant form, and (ii) commitment to the rule from any date t0 onward determines
an equilibrium that is optimal, subject to at most a finite number of constraints on the initial
evolution of the endogenous variables. Regarding constrained optimality as sufficient weakens
the sense in which the rule is required to be optimal; but there may be no time-invariant
policy that would be optimal in an unconstrained sense (that is, that would be t0-optimal).
Furthermore, the fact that the economy’s expected evolution under commitment to the rule
is optimal subject only to a constraint on its short-run evolution (and not, for example, any
constraint that requires long-run outcomes to resemble short-run outcomes) means that the
constraints on short-run outcomes are ones that an optimizing central bank would wish to be
subject to–and in particular, would wish for the private sector to expect it to be subject to–in
the future. Acceptance of such a constraint thus means conformity to a rule of behavior to which
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it would have been optimal to commit oneself in the past. Acting in conformity with such a rule
is a way of making it more credible that one will also act in conformity with it in the future,
and the central bank has an interest in creating the latter expectation. Note that a policy rule
that satisfies this criterion in period t0 will also satisfy it if the matter is reconsidered in any
later period; thus this approach to policy choice eliminates the problem of time-inconsistency.21
The definition just given does not identify the constraints on the economy’s short-run evo-
lution that should be accepted, and so there need not be a unique state-contingent evolution
from date t0 onward that can qualify as optimal from a timeless perspective. Nonetheless, the
constraints on the initial evolution of the economy are not arbitrary, for most constraints on
short-run outcomes have the property that even if one is subject to them, it would be optimal
to choose an equilibrium that does not satisfy them in the future. The requirement that the
equilibrium chosen be implementable through commitment to a time-invariant policy imposes
a strong self-consistency requirement on the choice of the initial constraints, though it does not
uniquely determine them. In fact, in a linear-quadratic policy problem of the kind considered
here (or in Giannoni and Woodford [11]), all policy rules that are optimal from a timeless per-
spective lead to the same long-run average values of endogenous variables such as output and
inflation, and to the same equilibrium responses to unexpected shocks that occur at date t0 or
later. The equilibria that are implemented by these rules differ only in a transitory, deterministic
component of the equilibrium paths of variables like inflation and output.
In the example considered here, a rule that is optimal from a timeless perspective must bring
about an equilibrium from date t0 onward that minimizes (2.7), subject to the constraints that
(2.1) and (2.3) hold for each t ≥ t0, and the additional constraint
πt0+1|t0 = π¯t0 , (2.25)
where the constraint value π¯t0 is selected in a time-invariant way, as a function of the economy’s
state in period t0 (after the realization of the exogenous disturbances, but before the determi-
nation of the endogenous variables). Furthermore, the rule for selecting π¯t0 must be one that is
satisfied by πt+1|t for all t > t0 in the constrained-optimal equilibrium from the standpoint of
period t0. Here we give two examples of rules for selecting the constraint on short-run outcomes
21 Of course, this property alone does not eliminate the incentive to deviate from such a policy commitment in
order to reduce expected losses conditional upon the state of the world at the time of the contemplated deviation.
We do not here attempt to model the mechanism that makes it possible for a central bank to commit itself to a
decision procedure other than unconstrained discretionary optimization. However, even granting the possibility
of commitment, it remains more credible that an institution should feel bound by a past commitment when the
logic of its own past analysis does not itself justify deviation at a later date.
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that have the desired property; this will suffice both to show that it is possible to satisfy the
self-consistency requirement, and to illustrate the point that the constraint need not be uniquely
defined.22
We first observe that if a t0-optimal equilibrium has been chosen at a date t0 that is now



















This suggests one possible specification of a pair of constraints of the form (2.25): one requires
that πt0+1|t0 satisfy (2.27) for t = t0. In fact, one easily sees that the evolution of expected
inflation and output from date t0 onward that minimizes (2.7) subject to this constraint is
just the one that satisfies (2.26) and (2.27) for all t ≥ t0.23 Hence, this is an example of a
self-consistent constraint on the economy’s short-run evolution of the kind discussed above. A
time-invariant policy rule that yields the evolution (2.26) and (2.27) as a determinate equilibrium
will therefore be optimal from a timeless perspective.
However, this is not the only state-contingent evolution from date t0 onward that can be
considered optimal from a timeless perspective. We may also select the constraints on short-run
outcomes in a way that depends on the initial values of predetermined endogenous variables,
rather than being a function solely of the history of exogenous disturbances as above. For







where xt0|t0−1 here denotes the actual output-gap plan in period t0 − 1. (Our choice of this
specification of the initial condition is motivated by the observation that πt0+1|t0 would have to
satisfy (2.23) in any τ -optimal equilibrium chosen at a date τ < t0.
24) Under this specification,
22 Giannoni and Woodford [11] provide a general approach to the choice of policy rules that are optimal from
a timeless perspective, in the context of a broad class of linear-quadratic policy problems.
23 The problem reduces to finding a solution to the system consisting of (2.1) and (2.3) together with (2.11)
and (2.12), with the initial condition (2.25) replacing (2.13). Our method of derivation of equations (2.27) and
(2.26) makes it obvious that they satisfy all of these equations.
24 A generalization of the approach used here is developed in Giannoni and Woodford [11].
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for all t ≥ t0.
The constraint (2.28) is observed to be self-consistent. For the solutions (2.29) and (2.30)
imply (2.21) and (2.23) for any t ≥ t0. Hence, we find once again that a time-invariant rule that
yields the evolution (2.29) and (2.30) as a determinate equilibrium is optimal from a timeless
perspective.
For most values of the initial condition xt0|t0−1, these state-contingent paths for expected
inflation and expected output in (2.29) and (2.30) will be different from those in (2.26) and (2.27)
(except asymptotically, when they coincide as ct+1−t0 → 0). They similarly both differ from the
t0-optimal equilibrium, described by (2.22) and (2.24), except asymptotically. However, both
examples of a timelessly optimal equilibrium agree with one another, and with the t0-optimal
equilibrium, in the linear terms involving the exogenous disturbances in periods t ≥ t0. These
several alternative conceptions of the optimal state-contingent evolution from period t0 onward
differ only in certain deterministic components of the equilibrium levels of inflation and output,
that in each case become negligible for t sufficiently greater than t0.
The examples of timelessly optimal equilibria just discussed are only two of an infinite
number of possibilities. More generally, we observe that the equilibrium resulting from adop-
tion of a timelessly optimal policy rule must satisfy conditions (2.11) and (2.12) for all t ≥
t0, for some value of Ξt0 . However, the value of Ξt0 need not satisfy (2.13) in general. In-
stead, Ξt0 is selected as some function of the state of the world, denoted ht0−1, in the pre-
vious period. For future reference, we define the state of the world in period t as ht ≡
{ut, rnt , it, it+1|t, πt+1|t, xt+1|t;ut−1, rnt−1, it−1, it|t−1, πt|t−1, xt|t−1; ...}.
Our characterization of optimal equilibrium already allows us to reach one important con-
clusion about optimal policy. This is that a purely forward-looking decision procedure cannot
be used to implement an optimal equilibrium. In the current model, the equations that de-
termine the expected future values of the goal variables, πt+τ |t and xt+τ |t for τ ≥ 1, for any
given expected future path of the central bank’s instrument, depend only upon expectations in
period t of the future paths of the exogenous disturbances. Thus, if the central bank does not
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itself plan to condition its decisions in period t or later on information other than information
about the exogenous disturbance processes, then its forecasts of the future evolution of the tar-
get variables will be independent of any other information (specifically, the value of any lagged
endogenous variables). Under a purely forward-looking decision procedure, its decisions during
the period-t decision cycle should similarly be independent of any such “irrelevant” information.
And then, if a correct private-sector understanding of this policy rule results in a determinate
rational-expectations equilibrium, the equilibrium will be one in which the evolution of the target
variables is independent of “irrelevant” lagged endogenous variables.25
But we have seen that an optimal equilibrium is necessarily not of this kind. In the case that
(2.2) and (2.4) hold, all information about the future evolution of the disturbances is summarized
by the current disturbances ut and r
n
t . Thus, an equilibrium that could be implemented using a
purely prospective decision procedure would have to make πt+1|t and xt+1|t functions of ut and
rnt . Our above solutions do not have this character; instead, xt|t−1 and, therefore, the entire
history {ut−j}∞j=1, back at least to period t0, affect the optimal values of both variables. Thus, a
decision procedure that can implement an optimal equilibrium must involve a degree of history-
dependence not allowed for in the types of purely prospective policy procedures often assumed
in discussions of inflation targeting. Examples of suitable sources of history-dependence are
presented in sections 3 through 5.
2.3. Interest rates in an optimal equilibrium
To each of the optimal paths for inflation and the output gap just characterized, there corre-
sponds an optimal path for the nominal interest rate. Taking the conditional expectation of
(2.3) in period t and solving for it+1|t, we obtain
it+1|t = rnt+1|t + πt+2|t +
1
σ
(xt+2|t − xt+1|t). (2.31)
Substitution of (2.14), which holds for all t > t0 in a t0-optimal equilibrium and in the equilibrium
associated with any timelessly optimal policy rule, into (2.31) then yields




25 Even if equilibrium is indeterminate, if one expects that the equilibrium that should result in practice will
be selected by a “minimum-state-variable” (MSV) criterion, like that suggested by McCallum [23], then the
equilibrium selected will not depend upon the “irrelevant” lagged endogenous variables, and the argument in the
text goes through. If one admits that non-MSV equilibria may occur, then the equilibria that may occur will
include a large number of equilibria other than the optimal one.
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for all t > t0. Finally, substitution of the equilibrium values of πt+2|t discussed above yields a
stochastic process for the forecastable component of the interest rate.
For example, in the case of a timelessly optimal policy resulting in the equilibrium described
by (2.26) and (2.27), the associated forecastable component of the interest rate is given by
it+1|t = i∗t+1, where












(Here we also assume (2.4), allowing us to replace rn
t+1|t by r¯ + ω(r
n
t − r¯).) Note that the
exogenous process {i∗t+1}∞t=t0 also indicates how the expected interest rate must evolve, as a
function of the history of exogenous disturbances, in any optimal equilibrium that has been in
existence for a long enough period of time.
Alternatively, in the case of a timelessly optimal policy resulting in the equilibrium described
by (2.21) and (2.23), the expected interest rate is given by it+1|t = ı¯t+1, where




1− βρc(ρ+ c− 1)ut + fxt|t−1, (2.33)
where
f ≡ λσ − κ
κσ
(1− c)c. (2.34)
Note that in (2.33) we have expressed the endogenous process ı¯t+1 as a time-invariant function
of the state of the world ht, a representation that will be useful for our discussion below of
associated reaction functions; a corresponding expression for it+1|t as a function of ht0−1 and
the exogenous disturbances in periods t0 through t can be obtained by substituting expression
(2.29) for xt|t−1 into (2.33). And once again, we observe that, if initial conditions ht0−1 are
consistent with the stationary optimal equilibrium (2.26) and (2.27), processes (2.32) and (2.33)
will coincide exactly at all times. (This can be seen by observing that if one instead uses (2.26)
to substitute for xt|t−1 in (2.33), one obtains (2.32).)
None of our optimality conditions place any restrictions upon the path of the unforecastable
component of the interest rate, and indeed, from the point of view of the objective assumed
above, its path is completely arbitrary, as it has no effect upon either spending or pricing
decisions in this model. However, it is plausible to assume that one should prefer less variable
interest rates, other things being equal.26 It follows that it can never be desirable to have any
26 Woodford [47, chapter 6] discusses reasons why one may even be willing even to accept somewhat more
variable inflation and output gaps for the sake of improved interest-rate stabilization. Svensson [38, section 5.6]
expresses scepticism about those reasons. We abstract from such concerns here, in order to simplify the algebra
in our analysis.
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unforecastable interest-rate fluctuations; thus we stipulate that an optimal policy will imply that
it+1 = it+1|t at all times. With this additional stipulation, we can now derive unique equilibrium
interest-rate processes associated with each of the possible optimal equilibria. These are given
by the above equations, with it+1 replacing it+1|t.
This result still only tells us how it is desirable for interest rates to evolve in equilibrium, as
a function of the disturbances that hit the economy; it does not tell us what form of policy rule
should be adopted by the central bank, in order to bring about an equilibrium of the desired
character. Simply committing to set interest rates as the specified function of the history of
disturbances is not the only type of policy rule that would be consistent with an equilibrium of
the desired kind, and in fact we shall argue that this would not be a desirable approach to the
implementation of optimal policy–it would be inferior to other approaches, both on the ground
of non-robustness of the policy rule to changes in the model of the economy, and on the ground
that equilibrium will not be determinate under such a rule.
Still, this characterization of optimal equilibrium interest-rate paths can help to identify
possible forms of policy rules that will be consistent with one or another of the optimal equilibria
just discussed. In particular, any given explicit decision procedure will imply a reaction function
it+1 = F (st+1, ht) (2.35)
indicating the way in which the central bank’s instrument is set as a function of the information
available to it in decision cycle t+1, consisting of all exogenous disturbances, st+1 ≡ (ut+1, rnt+1),
in period t + 1 and the state of the world, ht, in period t.
27 Recall that we assume that all
exogenous disturbances st+1 realized in period t + 1 are already known to the central bank
before its instrument setting for period t+ 1 must be chosen, but that period-t+ 1 endogenous
variables, the inflation and output-gap plans πt+1|t and xt+1|t, that generally depend upon the
bank’s action, cannot be directly responded to; instead the bank can respond only to its forecasts
of how these variables should evolve. However, all elements of ht, including period-t endogenous
variables, are assumed to be public information prior to the bank’s period-t+ 1 decision cycle;
thus it+1 may respond to them.
In this study we shall restrict our attention to decision procedures of two broad types,
targeting rules and explicit instrument rules. Each of these classes implies a further restriction
upon the possible form of the reaction function. In the case of a targeting rule, the setting of it
27 In general, the vector st+1 includes all information as of period t + 1 about the paths of the exogenous
disturbances in periods t+ τ for τ ≥ 1. In the special case that both disturbances are Markovian, as assumed in




chosen during the period-t decision cycle is not expected to affect the period-t target variables,
πt and xt, since these are assumed to be predetermined; only the private sector’s forecast of the
setting during previous periods matters for the period-t target variables. Hence, the targeting
procedure must instead be used to choose a commitment it+1,t regarding the interest-rate setting
to be adopted in the following period; the interest rate itself is simply set in accordance with the
commitment made during the previous decision cycle: it+1 = it+1,t. It then follows that under
any such rule, the interest rate it+1 will be a function of information available to the central bank
during its period-t decision cycle. Under our information specification, this means a function of
variables that are predetermined in period t, or exogenous variables realized in period t, so that
the implied reaction function associated with such a policy must be of the more restricted form
it+1 = F (st, ht−1). (2.36)
Given that the reaction function must have the form (2.36), we can uniquely identify the
implied reaction function that must be implied by any targeting rule that is consistent with a
particular equilibrium from the adoption date t0 onward. To do this, we simply read off our
solution, above, for it+1 as a function of st and ht−1. Thus, a targeting rule consistent with the




where i∗t+1 is defined in (2.32), while a targeting rule consistent with the equilibrium (2.21) and
(2.23) must yield the implied reaction function
it+1 = ı¯t+1. (2.38)
where ı¯t+1 is defined in (2.33). Of course, these reaction functions do not yet uniquely identify
the form of the policy rule; alternative high-level policy prescriptions might imply the same
reaction function. We give examples below of targeting procedures that imply each of these
reaction functions.
In the case of an explicit instrument rule, instead, the policy rule is just a commitment to
set the instrument in accordance with a particular reaction function. One advantage of this
way of specifying the policy rule is that the instrument setting in period t + 1 need no longer
be a function solely of information available at the time of the period-t decision cycle; it can
instead make use of information available only by the time of the period-t + 1 decision cycle.
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Because unforecastable interest-rate movements are undesirable, an optimal instrument rule will
nevertheless necessarily be of the restricted form
it+1 = F (ht) (2.39)
rather than of the form (2.35). Yet there remains an advantage of family (2.39) over the even
more restrictive family (2.36), which is that it allows it+1 to respond to endogenous variables
realized in period t–information that we assume is available to the private sector when making
its period-t decisions, but not during the central bank’s period-t decision cycle. This can be
useful in that it allows the central bank to respond in period t+1 to private-sector decisions in
period t, πt+1|t and xt+1|t, that are inconsistent with the equilibrium that it is trying to bring
about (and thus inconsistent with its own forecasts of those variables during its period-t decision
cycle). A commitment to such responses can be useful, as we show later, in excluding unwanted
alternative rational-expectations equilibria.
In the case of the more flexible specification (2.39), we can no longer uniquely determine the
reaction function from our above solution for the equilibrium interest-rate process. Our discus-
sion above allowed us to determine how it+1 must depend upon st and ht−1 in the equilibrium
that we wish to implement. However, many endogenous variables in ht will also be functions
of these variables, and (assuming that the variables co-move as in the desired equilibrium) the
desired variation in interest rates can therefore be arranged by setting it+1 as a function of these
variables, rather than by setting it as a direct function of the variables observed by the central
bank by the time of its period-t decision cycle. There will thus generally be a large number of
possible instrument rules consistent with a given equilibrium, even though there is a one-to-one
correspondence between instrument rules and reaction functions.
2.4. The problem of indeterminacy
One aspect of the problem of implementing optimal policy is finding a decision procedure that
is consistent with an optimal equilibrium, as characterized above. But even when we find a
procedure that satisfies this criterion–say, a targeting rule that implies reaction function (2.37)
or (2.38)–there remains the question whether the optimal equilibrium is the only equilibrium
consistent the specified policy rule. In addressing this question, it suffices to characterize a
policy rule in terms of the reaction function that it implies.28 Our question is then whether the
28 Note, however, that for some other questions–notably the analysis of robustness–the reaction function is
not a sufficient description of a policy rule. It is for this reason that we are careful in this paper not to identify
policy rules with their implied reaction functions.
26
system of equations consisting of (2.1), (2.3) and either (2.36) or (2.39) has a unique bounded (or
non-explosive) rational-expectations equilibrium.29 In this case, we shall say that equilibrium is
determinate, and we shall assume that the coordination of private-sector expectations upon the
determinate equilibrium is unproblematic.
One case in which this condition fails to be satisfied is when the reaction function makes
the interest rate a function solely of exogenous state variables. In this case, equilibrium is
indeterminate, for essentially the same reason as in the analysis of Sargent and Wallace [30].
When it+1 is an exogenous process, the endogenous variables {πt+1|t}∞t=t0 and {xt+1|t}∞t=t0 are
determined solely by a pair of difference equations obtained by taking the expectation of (2.1)
and (2.3) conditional upon information in period t. This system can be written in vector form
as
zt+1|t =Mzt +Ns˜t (2.40)



















−σ/β 1 + κσ/β

 ,
and the matrix N has elements that do not matter for our argument.
Using standard methods, this system has a unique bounded solution for the process {zt}∞t=t0
if and only if both eigenvalues of the matrix M have modulus greater than one (in which case
the solution would be obtained by “solving forward”). The characteristic equation ofM is given
by






29 We shall not demand the existence of a unique solution to our linear equation system, when even explosive
solutions are counted. In general, in a forward-looking model, no policy rule will have that property. The apparent
explosive solutions may not correspond to true rational expectations equilibria. One reason is that the conditions
for optimality in the private-sector decision problems underlying our structural equations (2.1) and (2.3) include
transversality conditions as well as the first-order conditions to which our structural equations correspond. These
additional requirements for optimality are necessarily satisfied by any bounded solution, but may not be satisfied
by an explosive solution. Furthermore, our structural equations are really only log-linear approximations to the
true (nonlinear) equilibrium conditions; bounded solutions to the log-linearized equations approximate solutions
to the exact conditions (in the case of small enough disturbances), but explosive solutions may not correspond
to any additional solutions to the exact conditions. Finally, determinacy as defined here implies at least local
uniqueness of the equilibrium that we consider, which may be considered a reason for greater confidence that the
private sector should coordinate its expectations upon the equilibrium than in the case where a very large number
of equilibria exist arbitrarily close to one another (the case of indeterminacy).
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which is easily seen to have two real roots satisfying 0 < µ1 < 1 < 1/β < µ2. Because |µ1| <
1, the condition for determinacy is not satisfied, and instead there is an infinite number of
bounded solutions. Since each solution for the forecastable components can be used to construct
an equilibrium process for inflation and the output gap using (2.5) and (2.6), we find that
equilibrium is indeterminate.30
This means that one cannot implement an optimal equilibrium simply by determining how
interest rates should evolve in that equilibrium, as a function of the history of exogenous distur-
bances, and then committing to that functional relation as a rule for setting the interest rate.
Such a policy rule would lead to indeterminacy. But there is a further immediate consequence
as well. This is that, in this model, any purely forward-looking decision procedure implies a
reaction function that results in indeterminacy of equilibrium if the central bank is committed
to this procedure. For as argued above, any purely forward-looking procedure implies a reaction
function that responds solely to information about the exogenous disturbance processes.
Thus, the desire to obtain a determinate equilibrium is another reason why a desirable policy
rule must involve some degree of history-dependence. In particular, we may now furthermore
clarify that it must involve some degree of dependence upon lagged endogenous variables–
whereas the mere criterion of consistency with an optimal equilibrium might be satisfied by
a policy rule that involved dependence solely upon lagged exogenous disturbances (such as a
commitment to (2.37) as an instrument rule).
As a simple example of how dependence upon lagged endogenous variables can bring about
determinacy, we may consider a Taylor-type rule which prescribes that the interest rate be set
each period at the value
it+1 = r¯ + gππt+1|t + gxxt+1|t, (2.43)
for some coefficients gπ, gx ≥ 0.31 Substituting this rule into (2.3) to eliminate the interest rate,
30 In particular, let e be the right eigenvector of M associated with eigenvalue µ1, and let {z¯t}∞t=t0 be any
bounded solution to (2.40). Then consider the alternative process defined by
zt = z¯t + eδt, δt = µ1δt−1 + ξt,
where {ξt}∞t=t0 is any bounded random variable such that ξt+1|t = 0. Then the process {zt}∞t=t0 constructed
in this way is another bounded solution to (2.40). Note that this method works no matter what correlation ξt
may have with innovations in “fundamental” disturbances at date t, and no matter how large the variability of
ξt may be. Thus there is an infinite set of bounded equilibria; there is an infinite set of additional equilibria
arbitarily close to any given equilibrium; and these equilibria include ones in which the target variables fluctuate
in response to completely non-fundamental sources of uncertainty (“sunspot equilibria”), as well as an infinite
set of equilibria in which they respond solely to “fundamental” uncertainty, but in differing ways. Furthermore,
some of the equilibria involve arbitrarily large variability of both inflation and the output gap, and so arbitrarily
large values for the expected loss function (2.7). Thus such a policy rule is quite unappealing, if one worries at
all about the possibility of one of the less attractive equilibria being the one that results.
31 Note that if we assume that prices and output are both entirely predetermined, as in Rotemberg andWoodford
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we again obtain an equation system of the form (2.40), with the vector zt defined as in (2.41),




−σ/β + σgπ 1 + κσ/β + σgx

 . (2.44)
One then observes that both roots of the characteristic equation have modulus greater than one,




gx > 1. (2.45)
Thus, a sufficiently strong response to fluctuations in either inflation or the output gap suffices
for determinacy.32
Note that a reaction function of the form (2.43) must be interpreted as an instrument rule,
rather than as an implied reaction function associated with a targeting rule, because it involves
dependence on endogenous variables realized only in period t. The possibility of such dependence
is an advantage of instrument rules, from the point of view of ensuring determinacy. Note that it
is not equivalent for the central bank to commit to responding in this way to its own forecast of
these variables during its period-t decision cycle, even though all period-t exogenous disturbances
are assumed to be observed at that time. This is because a commitment to respond in period t+1
to private-sector actions in period t that deviate from the equilibrium expected by the central
bank may be useful in ensuring that equilibria other than that one are not equally consistent
with private-sector optimization.
However, as we illustrate below, it is not necessary for determinacy that there be feedback
from period-t endogenous variables in the setting of it+1; thus reaction functions of the form
(2.36) may also imply a determinate equilibrium.33 However, our Taylor-type example shows
that in the case of an instrument rule, determinacy can be achieved even with a rule that involves
no dependence of the instrument upon lagged variables more than one period in the past; in the
[27] and [28], this rule specifies the interest rate as a function of current inflation and output, as in Taylor’s original
formulation [40]. In the case that these variables are not entirely predetermined, direct dependence upon current
inflation and output would not be possible, as these are not yet observed during the bank’s period t decision cycle.
We might allow dependence upon the bank’s estimates of those variables, πt+1,t and xt+1,t–which estimates will
in fact always be perfectly accurate, because of (2.5) and (2.6)–but such a rule would be dominated by the one
proposed in the text, because of the undesirability of unforecastable interest-rate movements. It should be noted
that the analysis of determinacy would proceed in exactly the same way for either version of the rule.
32 Note that the coefficients called for by Taylor [40], namely gπ = 1.5 and gx = 0.5, necessarily imply
determinacy. More generally, such a rule results in determinacy if and only if it respects what Woodford [47,
chapter 2], calls the “Taylor principle”: the requirement that a sustained increase in the rate of inflation must
eventually result in an increase in the nominal interest rate of an even greater size. Since (2.1) implies that a unit
permanent increase in inflation implies a permanent increase in the output gap of (1− β)/κ units, a rule of the
form (2.43) satisfies this principle if and only if (2.45) holds.
33 See the analysis in section 4 of determinacy in the case of a reaction function of the form (2.38).
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case of a targeting rule, determinacy requires that the reaction function (and hence, the central
bank’s targets themselves) depend on endogenous variables in period t − 1 or earlier. Thus,
there is a sense in which the required degree of history-dependence is even greater in the case
of a targeting rule.
We turn now to an analysis of the consequences of particular decision procedures for monetary
policy. We pay particular attention to “forecast targeting” rules, given the reasons for interest
in this class of procedures noted in section 1.
3. Commitment to a modified loss function
In this section, we discuss our highest-level policy specification, a general targeting rule, which is
in terms of a loss function that the central bank is committed to seeking to minimize, through a
forecast-based dynamic optimization procedure. We first specify how the central bank computes
its forecasts and show the outcome for the optimal forecasts if the central bank uses the social
loss function to evaluate these. We show that selecting the optimal forecasts under complete
discretion results in a time-consistency problem. One way to restore time-consistency is to
apply dynamic programming, and resort to forecasts consistent with the inefficient equilibrium
resulting from discretionary optimization (as characterized, for example, using the method of
So¨derlind [32]). A more attractive way to restore time-consistency is a general targeting rule in
the form of a modified loss function, the minimization of which results in forecasts consistent
with the optimal equilibrium. We then discuss issues connected with implementation of the
optimal equilibrium under this approach.
3.1. Forecast targeting
All of the procedures that we discuss in this section involve a particular approach to dynamic
optimization, that we call “forecast targeting”. Under forecast targeting, the central bank
first constructs conditional inflation, output-gap, and interest-rate forecasts corresponding to
alternative feasible policies, and then chooses the preferred scenario according to the specified
loss function. (A similar procedure is used in the case of our discussion in the next section of
specific targeting rules, except that the preferred scenario is chosen as the one that satisfies
a specified target criterion.) Let it ≡ {it+τ,t}∞τ=1 denote such an interest-rate path considered
in period t, where it+τ,t denotes the interest rate considered for period t + τ , τ ≥ 1. Let
πt ≡ {πt+τ,t}∞τ=1 and xt ≡ {xt+τ,t}∞τ=1 denote conditional (mean) inflation and output-gap
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forecasts (forecast paths) considered in period t. We use the notation πt+τ,t and xt+τ,t to
distinguish the central bank’s internal forecast in period t for period t + τ from private-sector
inflation and output-gap expectations in period t for period t+ τ , πt+τ |t and xt+τ |t.
The forecast paths in period t will be related according to the central bank’s forecast model,
πt+τ,t = βπt+τ+1,t + κxt+τ,t + ut+τ,t, (3.1)
xt+τ,t = xt+τ+1,t − σ(it+τ,t − πt+τ+1,t − rnt+τ,t) (3.2)
for τ ≥ 1. Here ut ≡ {ut+τ,t}∞τ=1 and rnt ≡ {rnt+τ,t}∞τ=1 denote the central bank’s (mean)
forecasts of the exogenous shocks to the aggregate-supply equation and the natural interest rate,
conditional on information available in period t (that is, ut+τ,t ≡ Etut+τ and rnt+τ,t ≡ Etrnt+τ
for τ ≥ 1). The set of paths satisfying these conditions are the ones over which the bank then
optimizes.34
3.2. Discretionary minimization of the social loss function
Let us first examine the situation when the central bank uses the social loss function to evaluate
alternative forecast paths, and chooses as its preferred forecast the one that minimizes the
corresponding expected loss. In this case, the central bank’s period loss function over the




[π2t+τ,t + λ(xt+τ,t − x∗)2] (3.3)
for τ ≥ 1, where in equilibrium Lt+τ,t will differ from EtLt+τ by a constant. Thus, in period t the
central bank wishes to find the combination (it, πt, xt) of an interest-rate path and conditional





where Lt, given by (2.8), is predetermined.
Note that once the central bank has determined its forecasts of the cost-push shock and
the natural interest rate, ut and rnt, this is a deterministic optimization problem, in contrast
34 Constructing conditional forecasts in a backward-looking model (that is, a model without forward-looking
variables) is straightforward. Constructing such forecasts in a forward-looking model raises some specific dif-
ficulties, discussed in Svensson [36, appendix A]. The conditional forecasts for an arbitrary interest-rate path
derived in the present paper and in Svensson [36, appendix A] assume that the interest-rate paths are “credible”,
that is, anticipated and allowed to influence the forward-looking variables. A different approach to constructing
conditional inflation forecasts for arbitrary interest-rate paths is used by Leeper and Zha [19], who assume that
these interest-rate paths result from unanticipated deviations from a normal reaction function.
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to the stochastic optimization problem examined above in section 2.1. Furthermore, for any
conditional forecasts πt and xt, the corresponding interest-rate path it can be constructed from
(3.2) by solving for it+τ,t,
it+τ,t = r
n
t+τ,t + πt+τ+1,t +
1
σ
(xt+τ+1,t − xt+τ,t). (3.5)
Therefore, the central bank can solve the problem in two steps. First, it considers xt+τ,t as a
control variable, and chooses it so that xt and πt fulfill (3.1) and minimize (3.4). Second, it
calculates the corresponding it according to (3.5).











t+τ,t + λ(xt+τ,t − x∗)2]




where Ξt+τ,t is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (3.1) for period t + τ , considered in
period t. Differentiating with respect to πt+τ,t and xt+τ,t gives the first-order conditions
πt+τ,t − Ξt+τ,t + Ξt+τ−1,t = 0, (3.7)
λ(xt+τ,t − x∗) + κΞt+τ,t = 0 (3.8)
for τ ≥ 1, together with the initial condition
Ξt,t = 0. (3.9)





(xt+τ,t − xt+τ−1,t) = 0 (3.10)




(xt+1,t − x∗) = 0 (3.11)
for τ = 1. Thus, finding the optimal forecasts reduces to the problem of finding πt and xt that
satisfy (3.1), (3.10) and (3.11).
As noted in Woodford [45], these first-order conditions define a decision procedure that will
not be time-consistent. This can be seen from the fact that the first-order condition for τ = 1,
(3.11), is different from that for τ ≥ 2, (3.10). This results because, in deciding on πt+1,t, the
central bank takes the previous period’s forecast πt+1,t−1 as given, and lets πt+1,t deviate from
it without assigning any specific cost to doing so. As a result, the forecasts in period t are
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not generally consistent with the forecasts made in period t − 1, even if no new information is
received in period t.
To see this, suppose that the forecasts πt−1 and xt−1 were constructed in period t − 1 so
as to minimize the intertemporal loss function (3.4) with t − 1 substituted for t. The same
procedure in period t − 1 as above then resulted in the same first-order conditions (3.10) and
(3.11), although with t− 1 substituted for t. Thus, in period t− 1, the first-order condition for




(xt+1,t−1 − xt,t−1) = 0. (3.12)
Without any new information in period t relative to period t−1, we should have πt+1,t = πt+1,t−1
and xt+1,t = xt+1,t−1 for intertemporal consistency. From (3.11) and (3.12) it is apparent that
this will not be the case, unless by chance xt,t−1 = x∗.
This illustrates that the period-t forecasts for period-t+1 inflation under the above procedure
will generally differ from the forecasts of period-t+1 inflation in period t− 1. This also implies
that when there is reoptimization in period t+ 1, with new optimal forecasts constructed then,
the period-t+1 forecast of period-t+2 inflation, πt+2,t+1, would normally differ from the period-t
forecast. Thus, the above procedure will not result in time-consistent forecasts, and will violate
the intuitive condition stated in Svensson [35], according to which “if no new information has
arrived, the forecasts and the interest rate path [should be] the same, and interest setting [should
follow] the same interest rate path.”
3.3. A dynamic-programming procedure
One way to make the forecasts time-consistent would be for the central bank to recognize in
period t that the forecasts will be reoptimized in period t + 1, and to incorporate this in its
forecasts in period t. This would amount to application of the dynamic-programming approach
assumed in standard expositions of the Markov equilibrium resulting from discretionary opti-
mization in a model like ours (such as So¨derlind [32]). Under this alternative approach, the
first-order conditions (3.7) and (3.8) for the forecasts in period t will instead take the form
πt+τ,t − Ξt+τ,t = 0, (3.13)





(xt+τ,t − x∗) = 0, (3.15)
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for τ ≥ 1.
Using (3.15) in (3.1) and solving in the usual manner, we find in this case that the optimal
forecast paths are given by
xt+τ,t =
λ(1− β)
κ2 + λ(1− β)x
∗ − κ




κ2 + λ(1− β)x
∗ +
λ
κ2 + λ(1− βρ)ρ
τut.
One may verify that in this case the forecasts are now intertemporally consistent.
The corresponding instrument path it is then given by (3.5). It follows that in the period-t
decision cycle, the central bank will plan to set the interest rate in period t+ 1 according to
it+1 = it+1,t =
λκ
κ2 + λ(1− β)x
∗ + r¯ + ω(rnt − r¯) +
ρλ+ (1− ρ)κ/σ
κ2 + λ(1− βρ) ρut. (3.16)
In at least one possible equilibrium associated with this procedure, private-sector plans agree
with the forecasts, πt+1|t = πt+1,t and xt+1|t = xt+1,t. In this equilibrium, the forecastable
components of inflation and the output gap evolve according to
xt+1|t =
λ(1− β)
κ2 + λ(1− β)x
∗ − κ
κ2 + λ(1− βρ)ρut, (3.17)
πt+1|t =
λκ
κ2 + λ(1− β)x
∗ +
λ
κ2 + λ(1− βρ)ρut. (3.18)
This equilibrium differs from the optimal equilibrium, described by (2.26) and (2.27), in
several respects. First, as long as x∗ > 0, there is an average inflation bias, since E[πt+1] > 0.
Second, the average output gap is positive, E[xt] > 0.
35 Third, the equilibrium lacks history-
dependence, since πt+1|t and xt+1|t do not depend on the past output-gap plan xt|t−1 or past
disturbances ut−j . Fourth, the coefficients on ut are different, illustrating the “stabilization
bias” discussed in Jonsson [12], Svensson [34], Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler [4] and Woodford [44].
We shall not examine the actual implementation of such an equilibrium further. Let us just
note that (3.16) implies that the interest rate will be a function of the exogenous disturbances.
If the private sector perceives of this setup as just being characterized by the reaction function
(3.16) and the model equations (2.1) and (2.3), then it follows from the argument of section 2.4
that equilibrium is indeterminate. Suppose instead that the private sector forms expectations in
35 The aggregate-supply equation (2.1) has the property that the long-run Phillips curve is positively sloped,
E[πt] = κE[xt]/(1−δ). This is because the assumption in the standard Calvo setup that firms between optimizing
price changes keep their nominal price fixed. If instead, as in Yun [48], it is assumed that prices between optimizing
price changes are indexed to the average inflation rate, the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. (Similarly, in the
standard Rotemburg setup, it is assumed that any price change is costly, making the long-run Phillips curve
positively sloped. If instead it is assumed that any price change different from the average inflation rate is costly,
the long-run Phillips curve is vertical.)
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accordance with the belief that, in a discretion equilibrium, inflation and the output gap in period
t+ 2 should only depend on the exogenous disturbances. Then the private-sector expectations
πt+2|t and xt+2|t in (2.1) and (2.3) are given exogenously, and private-sector expectations it+1|t
determine the plans πt+1|t and xt+1|t uniquely. Then the equilibrium is determinate, and the
equilibrium described by (3.17) and (3.18) will result.
3.4. Sequentially constrained optimization
We now show that a forecast-based optimization procedure can be rendered consistent with the
optimal equilibrium, through a suitable modification of the way in which the central bank evalu-
ates alternative forecast paths. As indicated in our discussion in section 2.1, a suitable procedure
must incorporate history-dependence of a kind that is lacking in the procedures discussed in the
previous section. One way of introducing the sort of history-dependence that is required is for
the central bank to commit itself to internalize the cost of systematically departing from its own
previous forecasts. As we have seen in the previous section, the existence of a motive for such
deviations is the reason for the suboptimality of a procedure aimed at minimization of the social
loss function.
In the case of a deterministic environment, it would be sufficient to add the condition
πt+1,t = πt+1,t−1
to the bank’s decision problem in period t. However, this would be inefficient in the more
realistic case where there is some new information each period, and hence good reason to let
πt+1,t deviate from πt+1,t−1, albeit in an unforecastable way. But we may instead imagine a
procedure in which the central bank chooses the forecast path that is optimal subject to a
constraint of the form
πt+1,t = π¯t(ut), (3.19)
where the value of π¯t(ut) for each possible realization of the disturbance ut is chosen as part of
the bank’s period-t− 1 decision.
It is clear that a dynamic-programming approach of this kind can create the necessary
history-dependence, at least in principle. As discussed in section 2.2 above, a timelessly optimal
equilibrium involves an expected evolution from any date t onward that is optimal subject to a
constraint of the form (2.25). Furthermore, as just discussed, the evaluation of expected losses
in any possible equilibrium from date t onward requires only a computation of the associated
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forecast paths. Hence, the choice of it+1,t that should be made at date t in order to implement the
timelessly optimal equilibrium can be made solely on the basis of an evaluation of the alternative
forecast paths that are consistent with the constraint (3.19), assuming that in possible state at
date t, π¯(ut) takes the same value as in (2.25).
In the case of both of the examples of timelessly optimal equilibria discussed in section 2.2,
the required constraint is of the form
π¯t(ut) = π¯t,t−1 +
ρc
1− βρc(ut − ut,t−1), (3.20)
where the intercept π¯t,t−1 depends only on the state of the economy in period t− 1.36 Thus we
may imagine that the central bank commits itself in period t−1 to subject itself in the following
decision cycle to a constraint of the form (3.20), where the value of π¯t,t−1 is chosen in period
t − 1. It is the choice of π¯t,t−1 on the basis of the economy’s state in period t − 1 that creates
the desired history-dependence of subsequent policy.
Because it is only π¯t,t−1 that must be chosen as part of the bank’s period-t−1 decision cycle,
the choice can be made purely on the basis of a selection among alternative possible forecast
paths at that time. (Note that the intercept in (3.20) that is consistent with the timelessly
optimal equilibrium is just the forecast value πt+1,t−1 associated with the constrained-optimal
forecast path selected by the central bank in its period-t− 1 decision cycle.) Furthermore, the
bank’s choice of the appropriate value for π¯t,t−1, like its choice of the appropriate value for it,t−1,
follows from its desire to bring about the constrained-optimal equilibrium, from among those
projected to be possible in its period-t−1 decision cycle. If and only if the bank selects the value
of π¯t,t−1 in this way will it expect its own constrained optimization procedure in the following
decision cycle to lead it to choose to continue the forecast path selected as constrained-optimal
in the current decision cycle.
We thus obtain a sequential forecast-based optimization procedure that is consistent with an
equilibrium that is optimal from a timeless perspective. (Either of the two timelessly optimal
equilibria discussed in section 2.2 can be shown to be consistent with a procedure of this form,
as long as one starts with the appropriate constraint in the first period that the procedure
is followed.) However, a possible disadvantage of the procedure, from the point of view of
36 Note that the coefficient on ut is the same in both (2.27) and (2.30). This is not accidental; the coefficient
must be the same in the case of any timelessly optimal equilibrium. For in any such equilibrium, the evolution of
the economy from date t onward satisfies the system consisting of (2.1), (2.3), (2.11) and (2.12) for some initial
condition Ξt−1; alternative equilibria differ only in the way that the initial condition is selected. But the initial
condition cannot depend on the realized value of ut, nor does the equilibrium response of inflation forecasts to
unexpected variation in ut depend on the value assigned to Ξt−1.
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communication with the public, is that the determination of which among the feasible forecast
paths at a given time are consistent with the constraint (3.19) depends on an evaluation of the
current disturbance ut, and the extent to which this differs from what was previously expected.
This means that the numerical value of this disturbance (that is not meaningful outside the
context of the bank’s structural model) must be discussed as part of the decision about which
among the feasible forecast paths should be selected, and not only in the course of generating
the set of feasible forecast paths. Furthermore, the procedure requires the bank to discuss its
forecast for this variable, and not simply the forecast paths of the target variables (inflation and
the output gap) about which the public cares. The need to explicitly discuss this variable and its
consequences for the constraint (3.19), if the public is to be able to verify that the central bank
is indeed basing its deliberations upon its putative objective, may be considered a difficulty for
practical implementation of the proposal.
3.5. Minimization of a modified loss function: “Commitment to continuity and pre-
dictability”
A closely related approach, that nonetheless avoids the difficulty just mentioned, is to modify
the loss function that the central bank uses to evaluate alternative forecast paths, rather than
restricting attention to forecast paths that satisfy a constraint of the form (3.19). It follows
from familiar Kuhn-Tucker theory that the constrained optimum of the previous section can
alternatively be characterized as the optimum of a loss function that includes an additional
term corresponding to the constraint. This dual approach is of particular interest in the present
case, because the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (3.19) is independent of the
value of ut.
37 This means that the central bank can choose the value of the Lagrange multiplier
that will modify its period-t decision problem as part of its period-t−1 decision cycle, and again
make this decision solely on the basis of a selection among feasible forecast paths at that time.
But in this case, there is no need in period t to adjust the value of the multiplier in response to
any surprise that may have occurred in the realization of ut.
Suppose that the central bank modifies the period loss function Lt+τ,t for τ = 1 by adding




[π2t+1,t + λ(xt+1,t − x∗)2] + Ξt,t−1(πt+1,t − πt+1,t−1) (3.21)
37 This follows from the fact that the constraint (3.19) corresponds to the self-consistent constraint (2.25)
associated with a timelessly optimal equilibrium.
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for Lt+1,t, where Ξt,t−1 is the corresponding Lagrange multiplier from the decision in period
t− 1.38 Then the first-order conditions are (3.7) and (3.8) for τ ≥ 1, where the initial condition
(3.9) for τ = 1 is replaced by
Ξt,t = Ξt,t−1. (3.22)




(xt,t−1 − x∗), (3.23)




(xt+1,t − xt,t−1) = 0 (3.24)
instead of (3.11). That is, the consolidated first-order condition (3.10) holds for τ ≥ 1, and not
just for τ ≥ 2, with the initial condition
xt,t = xt,t−1 (3.25)
for τ = 1. Comparison of these first-order conditions with (2.11) and (2.12) indicates that the
optimal forecasts πt and xt chosen in period t under this procedure correspond to the optimal
equilibrium. Hence, choice of it+1,t to be consistent with these optimal forecast paths will result
in a commitment to an interest rate that is consistent with continuation of the stationary optimal
equilibrium.
What is the economic interpretation of the multiplier Ξt,t−1? From the Lagrangian (3.6),
we see that Ξt,t−1 is the marginal loss in period t− 1 resulting from an increase in the inflation
forecast πt+1,t−1. Adding the term Ξt,t−1(πt+1,t − πt+1,t−1) to the period-t loss function means
that the central bank internalizes this cost when making decisions in period t. This is perhaps
a somewhat abstract consideration for the purposes of practical policymaking, but it is very
much in line with the continuity, predictability and transparency emphasized in actual inflation
targeting (see, for instance, King [17]). Hence, we refer to this case as a “commitment to
continuity and predictability.”
3.5.1. An explicit decision procedure
We turn now to an explicit, algorithmic description of the central bank’s decision procedure
under this proposal. At the beginning of the period-t decision cycle, we suppose that the central
38 Adding a linear term to the loss function is similar to the linear inflation contracts discussed in Walsh [43]
and Persson and Tabellini [26]. Indeed, the term added in (3.21) corresponds to a state-contingent linear inflation
contract, which, as discussed in Svensson [34], can remedy both stabilization bias and average-inflation bias.
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bank observes the current realizations of the exogenous disturbances, which it may use as an
input for its decisions; in particular, it observes the values of the current conditional expectations
ut and rnt. It also recalls its commitment it,t−1, chosen during the previous cycle, and the value
assigned to Ξt,t−1.
The first step in the decision procedure is the computation, using the bank’s forecasting
model, of the set of possible conditional forecasts πt and xt that are consistent with the model,
given the conditional expectations ut and rnt. In our example, these are the paths consistent
with (3.1) for all τ ≥ 1. It then evaluates the modified loss function, obtained by substituting
(3.21) into (3.4), for each possible joint forecast path. In this way, the optimal forecasts are
determined as well as the new value of the Lagrange multiplier, Ξt+1,t.
In our example, these optimal forecasts are the ones that satisfy the consolidated first-order
condition (3.10) for all τ ≥ 1, with the initial condition (3.25). Using (3.10) to eliminate πt+τ,t
in (3.1) for τ ≥ 1, we get the same second-order difference equation for xt+τ,t as obtained
above for xt+1|t, namely (2.16), but with the initial condition (3.25) instead of (2.18). Thus, the
characteristic equation again has the two eigenvalues c and 1/(βc), where 0 < c < 1, and the







(βc)jut+τ+j,t + cxt+τ−1,t (3.26)
for τ ≥ 1.
Since the forecasts ut+τ,t are given by the true (exogenous) conditional expectations ut+τ |t,




uniquely determined value. Under the assumption (2.2), this value is simply ρτ/(1−βρc) times











c− ρ ut + c
τxt,t−1 (3.28)










(1− ρ)ρτ−1 − (1− c)cτ−1




for each τ ≥ 1.
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In a third step, the central bank calculates the corresponding forecast path for its instrument,







for τ ≥ 1. The forecast path for the natural rate of interest is given by the true conditional
expectations (exogenous and known to the bank), while the forecast path for inflation is de-
termined as above. In the case that the disturbance processes satisfy both (2.2) and (2.4), the
interest-rate path is given by
it+τ,t = r¯ + ω





(1− ρ)ρτ − (1− c)cτ
c− ρ ut + fc
τ−1xt,t−1 (3.32)
for each τ ≥ 1.
Finally, the central bank makes its decisions. Its action–the setting of its operating target
it for the current period–is determined by the commitment made during the previous decision
cycle: it simply sets it = it,t−1. Its non-trivial current decisions are the selection of a commitment
it+1,t for its action in the following period, and a value for the Lagrange multiplier Ξt+1,t to be
used in the following period’s modified loss function. These values are both obtained as initial
elements of the forecast paths just computed. Thus, in the case of AR(1) disturbances the
decisions are
it+1,t = r¯ + ω(r
n


















where we have used (3.8) and (3.28) for τ = 1. These decisions are recorded for use as inputs
in the following decision cycle. At the beginning of period t + 1, the new realizations of the
exogenous disturbances are observed, and the cycle is repeated.
Several comments about this modified forecast-targeting process are appropriate. One is that
the forecast paths that are constructed in successive decision cycles are now time-consistent, in
the sense that the forecasts made in decision cycle t coincide with the forecast that the bank
would make in period t of what it will forecast using this procedure during any later decision
cycle. For example, the bank’s forecast in period t of the forecast path for inflation πt+1 during
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(1− ρ)ρτ−2 − (1− c)cτ−2





















(1− ρ)ρτ−1 − (1− c)cτ−1




for each τ ≥ 2. Here we have used (3.30) to substitute for πt+τ,t+1 in the first line and (3.28) to
substitute for xt+1,t in the second. Note that the final line agrees exactly with (3.30), so that
the forecasting procedure is consistent.
Furthermore, the bank’s forecasts are also consistent with at least one possible equilib-
rium associated with this policy. The forecasts are, by construction, consistent with (3.1) and
(3.2), which are conditions that the true conditional expectations must satisfy in a rational-
expectations equilibrium. In fact one can show that there exists an equilibrium, consistent with
the bank’s pattern of action under this procedure, in which the true conditional expectations co-
incide at all times with the bank’s forecasts (πt+τ |t = πt+τ,t, and so on). Checking this amounts
simply to verifying that the processes
πt+1 = πt+1,t + ut+1 − ut+1|t,




satisfy (2.1) and (2.3), when the bank forecasts are constructed as described above.
The equilibrium with this property is also observed to be one that is optimal from the point of
view of the timeless perspective defined in section 2.2. Specifically, if the policy regime begins in
some period t0, with initial conditions Ξt0,t0−1 and it0,t0−1 consistent with the stationary optimal
equilibrium, and is expected to continue forever, the equilibrium just described for periods t ≥ t0
corresponds to the continuation of the stationary optimal equilibrium. The hypothesized initial
















and it0,t0−1 = i
∗
t˙0
. Substitution of these initial conditions into the equations just derived is
easily seen to result in exactly the stationary optimal equilibrium characterized in section 2.2.
Furthermore, regardless of the initial conditions, the equilibrium involves the optimal responses
to shocks that occur from period t0 onward, as well as the optimal long-run average values for
the endogenous variables.39
Note that this procedure need not require that the bank’s decisions regarding it+1,t and Ξt+1,t
be made public, nor that it announce any other aspects of the forecast paths that it constructs
as part of the above decision procedure. It need simply set its instrument in the way that
has been specified, and, if its decision procedure (or rather, the consequences of the procedure)
are correctly understood by the private sector, the optimal equilibrium becomes a rational-
expectations equilibrium consistent with this policy. This is because under this procedure the
central bank’s forecasts (and actions) are a perfectly predictable function of the history of
exogenous disturbances, which are already assumed to be observed by the private sector. Thus,
revealing the forecasts, or the commitments chosen by the bank on the basis of them, reveals no
additional information.40
Nonetheless, announcement of the bank’s decisions regarding it+1,t and Ξt+1,t may be useful
in practice. First of all, the bank’s commitment to condition its future decisions upon these
past findings may be more reliably fulfilled when the commitments have been made public.
(Our analysis in the previous paragraph of the irrelevance of the information provided by the
announcements treats the bank’s commitment to the decision procedure as unproblematic.) And
second, the ability of the private sector to accurately forecast future policy (upon which the above
calculation of optimal policy relies) may be facilitated by such announcements of the bank’s
intentions with regard to future decision cycles. (Our analysis in the previous paragraph similarly
takes the private sector’s correct understanding of the bank’s decision procedure as given.)
Similar considerations apply with regard to publication of the bank’s forecasts. The fact that
past forecasts have been made public may strengthen the bank’s commitment to minimize the
modified loss function rather than the true social loss function; for unconstrained discretionary
39 Note that modification of the loss function to include the additional term in (3.21), in line with the inflation
contracts referred to in footnote 38, suffices to eliminate the average inflation bias resulting from discretionary
minimization of the true social loss function, even when the central bank’s loss function includes an output
gap target x∗ > 0. Thus there is no need to also modify the loss function in the way proposed by King [16],
setting x∗ = 0 even if that is not its true social value. It is thus an appealing feature of this approach that a
single modification of the purely discretionary procedure cures both the problems of “average inflation bias” and
“stabilization” bias.
40 The bank’s forecasts are predictable not simply given the relations between variables that should exist in
equilibrium, but regardless of the equilibrium that happens to be realized. For the procedure described above
takes as inputs no observations of external reality other than the evolution of the exogenous disturbances, and
involves no internal randomization either.
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optimization will result in outcomes that systematically disconfirm previous forecasts. And
obviously publication of the bank’s forecasts makes it easier for the private sector to coordinate
its own forecasts with those of the bank, and hence to act in the way assumed by the bank’s
analysis.41
3.5.2. The implied reaction function and determinacy
We turn now to the question of whether the optimal equilibrium just discussed is necessarily the
one that results from a commitment to the above procedure. In order to analyze this question,
it suffices to consider the implied reaction function of this policy rule, that is, the implied
mapping from exogenous and predetermined variables (the information of the central bank at
the beginning of each decision cycle) to the bank’s setting of its instrument. In the example
explicitly treated above, the reaction function of the policy rule is given by it+1 = it+1,t where















t+1 is defined above in (2.32). Thus, as discussed in section 2.4, this decision
procedure results in indeterminacy.
Thus, while the optimal equilibrium is one possible equilibrium consistent with a commit-
ment to this policy, it is only one of a very large set of possible equilibria, even if we restrict our
attention to stationary equilibria. The others are not optimal, involving sub-optimal responses
to disturbances (simply due to self-fulfilling expectations), or fluctuations in response to irrel-
evant “sunspot” variables, or both. Thus, the use of the modified loss function solves one of
the problems associated with discretionary minimization of the true social loss function–the
procedure is now consistent with the optimal equilibrium–but it does not eliminate the problem
of indeterminacy of equilibrium.
Arguably, the likelihood of the economy’s settling upon an inefficient equilibrium might be
reduced by making public the complete forecast paths calculated by the central bank. In this
case the coordination of private-sector expectations upon exactly those announced by the central
bank might be a natural “focal point” for the coordination game faced by private-sector agents
41 The central bank has no incentive to announce a different value for Ξt+1,t in order to manipulate the outcome
of subsequent decision cycles. Because doing so would affect private-sector expecations in period t of its future
decisions, this would lead to a worse equilibrium from the point of view of period t.
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deciding which outcome to expect. Nonetheless, this would be only one among a very large set
of other possible equilibria of that “game”. An alternative policy rule that is equally consistent
with the optimal equilibrium, and that makes it the unique (or at least the unique non-explosive)
equilibrium is superior (in at least this respect) to a rule that can only make that equilibrium a
“natural focal point” among a large set of possible equilibria.
3.6. A hybrid rule that ensures determinacy
Determinacy can, however, be ensured in a more reliable way–by committing the bank to a
policy that, if correctly understood by the private sector, excludes other equilibria–if the pure
targeting procedure described above is modified in a way that introduces some elements of
commitment to an instrument rule.
Note that a targeting procedure, as defined above, makes the bank’s actions dependent solely
upon its own internal forecasts of what will happen as a result of alternative decisions on its part.
Such a purely forecast-based procedure implies that the bank takes no note of whether realized
inflation and output gaps deviate from its forecasts (in a systematic way), or alternatively, of
whether private-sector plans and expectations deviate from central-bank forecasts. But this is
not necessarily reasonable behavior; and indeed, actual inflation-targeting central banks do seem
to monitor private-sector plans and expectations, as is apparent from their published Inflation
Reports.
When private-sector plans and expectations and the realized equilibrium deviate systemati-
cally from the central bank’s forecasts, one might well suppose that a forecast-targeting central
bank should react to this, by letting its interest-rate deviate from what it would otherwise have
set. For example, a bank might commit itself not to set it+1 = it+1,t regardless of whether its
forecasts turn out in the meantime to be confirmed, but instead to set the interest rate according
to a rule of the form
it+1 = it+1,t + gπ(πt+1|t − πt+1,t) + gx(xt+1|t − xt+1,t). (3.39)
Here it+1,t no longer represents a commitment made during the period-t decision cycle as to
the value of it+1 that will necessarily be set; but it is still the bank’s forecast during that
decision cycle as to the value that will be set, assuming that the economy continues to evolve in
accordance with the bank’s predictions.
Rule (3.39) no longer describes a pure targeting rule, in that the bank’s instrument setting
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it+1 no longer follows from a pure calculation of what the effects of one choice or another upon
the target variables should be. Instead, it has an element of commitment to an instrument
rule–an approach under which the central bank adjusts its instrument in a way that it has
committed itself to in advance, not because it judges at the time that this action will have a
desirable effect, but because it has judged at an earlier time that it would be desirable for the
private sector to anticipate behavior of this kind. Nonetheless, this is not a pure instrument
rule either (an approach considered further in section 5), as the rule for setting the interest rate
involves a time-varying coefficient it+1,t, which is chosen by the central bank through a targeting
procedure. It thus represents a sort of hybrid decision procedure.
The values of it+1,t, πt+1,t and xt+1,t in this equation are each chosen by the central bank
during its period-t decision cycle. They are all determined through exactly the same forecasting
exercise as has been described above. For in forming its forecasts, the bank expects its forecasts
to be correct; thus in computing what it expects the consequences of a given choice of it+1,t
to be, it still expects it+1 to equal it+1,t in equilibrium. Furthermore, this rule is consistent
with continuation of the stationary optimal equilibrium, for the same reason that the specific
targeting rule described above is; for in the case that equilibrium occurs (as forecast by the
central bank), the actions prescribed by (3.39) are identical to those prescribed by the general
targeting rule.
However, the two procedures do not prescribe identical behavior out of equilibrium, and
they may differ as to the determinacy of equilibrium. When the central bank follows the explicit
decision procedure outlined in section 3.5.1, which results in the implied reaction function it+1,t =
i∗t+1, (3.39) would correspond to
it+1 = i
∗
t+1 + gπ(πt+1|t − πt+1,t) + gx(xt+1|t − xt+1,t). (3.40)
This reaction function is such that the central bank first decides on the interest rate plan,
it = {it+τ,t}∞τ=1 consistent with achieving the optimal inflation and output-gap forecasts, πt =
{πt+τ,t}∞τ=1 and xt = {xt+τ,t}∞τ=1, that minimize the intertemporal loss function modified ac-
cording to (3.21), which results in it+1,t = i
∗
t+1, as we have seen. If it, after having announced
this interest-rate plan, it observes that private-sector plans for inflation and the output gap,
πt+1|t and xt+1|t, deviate from its forecasts, πt+1,t and xt+1,t, it makes a further adjustment
of the interest rate implemented in period t + 1 according to (3.40). (Note that this is still
a reaction function of the form (2.39), though it no longer satisfies the information restriction
assumed in (2.36), as a pure targeting rule would.)
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Let us now consider the determinacy of equilibrium under such a commitment. When (3.40)
is combined with the expectation of (2.1) and (2.3), the dynamic system can again be written













where we exploit that the central bank forecasts πt+1,t and xt+1,t depend on the exogenous shocks
only. The matrix M is given by (2.44). It follows that a sufficient condition for determinacy
is that the coefficients gπ and gx fulfill (2.45). Since the optimal equilibrium is one possible
equilibrium, the unique equilibrium must be the optimal one.
In equilibrium, private-sector plans and central-bank forecasts will be equal, so the term in
(3.39) that involves the coefficients gπ and gx will always be zero. The commitment to deviate
from i∗t+1 in proportion to any deviation of private-sector plans from central bank forecasts is
an out-of-equilibrium commitment that will not be noted in the equilibrium. The direction of
the deviation is intuitive; if private-sector plans for inflation and/or the output gap exceed the
central-bank forecasts, the bank responds with tighter policy–a higher interest rate.
Thus, determinacy is possible in the case of a hybrid rule of this kind, regardless of the values
of the model’s structural parameters; one simply need to choose any values for gπ and gx that
fulfills (2.45), for instance, Taylor’s [40] classic values 1.5 and .5, respectively. This illustrates the
fact that a commitment to respond to variables that are predetermined, and hence irrevocable,
by the time that the bank responds to them may nonetheless be desirable.
4. Commitment to a specific targeting rule
In this section, we introduce our second, intermediate-level policy specification. This is in terms
of a specific targeting rule, specifying a criterion that the bank’s forecast paths for its target
variables must satisfy. This kind of rule specifies a relation involving one or more endogenous
variables that cannot be directly observed at the time that policy is chosen, and that instead
must be forecasted. Furthermore, in the case of a forward-looking model, even forecasting
endogenous variables a short time in the future will in general require solving for the model’s
equilibrium into the indefinite future; thus a forecast of the entire future paths of the various
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variables is required. A decision procedure of this kind is therefore still organized around the
construction of forecast paths conditional upon alternative policies, even if explicit optimization
is not undertaken. In the case of such a targeting rule, the history-dependence necessary for
determinacy and optimality must be introduced through commitment to a rule that involves
lagged endogenous variables as well as forecasts of their future values.
A natural candidate for such a specific targeting rule is the consolidated first-order condition
(2.14) for all t ≥ t0. This condition is not only consistent with the optimality in a timeless
perspective, but has the property that, if the central bank could arrange for (2.14) to hold for
all t ≥ t0, this condition would determine a unique bounded solution for periods t ≥ t0 given by
equations (2.29) and (2.30).
However, the central bank cannot directly ensure that such a relation between the paths of
its target variables is satisfied. It can, however, adjust its policy so as to produce forecast paths
that satisfy this condition. Thus, the targeting rule commits the bank to a policy under which




(xt+τ |t+τ−1 − xt+τ |t+τ−2)],t = 0 (4.1)
for all τ ≥ 1. This is a targeting rule involving private-sector plans of one-period-ahead inflation
and the output gap. Using the facts that, for τ ≥ 1, [πt+τ |t+τ−1],t ≡ πt+τ,t and [xt+τ |t+τ−1],t ≡
xt+τ,t (under the maintained assumption that the bank does not yet observe current private-
sector plans or expectations at the time it makes its current forecast), whereas [xt|t−1],t ≡ xt|t−1
(under the assumption that lagged private-sector plans and expectations are observable), this is




(xt+τ,t − xt+τ−1,t) = 0 (4.2)
for τ ≥ 1, with the convention that
xt,t ≡ xt|t−1. (4.3)
Thus, the condition depends upon actually observed past private-sector plans in period t−1 for
the output gap in period t, xt|t−1. Note that this differs from the case of a commitment to a
modified loss function in section 3.5, cf. (3.25).42
In order to find the forecasts πt and xt that fulfill this specific targeting rule, the bank
combines (4.2) and (4.3) with the aggregate-supply relation (3.1). Using (4.2) to eliminate
42 Leitemo [20] examines the consequences in a forward-looking model of another targeting rule, namely that a
constant-interest-rate inflation forecast should equal the inflation target at a specified horizon.
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πt+τ,t, it gets the same second-order difference equation for xt+τ,t as obtained above in section
3.5, except that the initial condition is (4.3) rather than (3.25). This implies the same solution
(3.28) and (3.30), except that they depend on the previous private-sector output-gap plan xt|t−1












(1− ρ)ρτ−1 − (1− c)cτ−1




Using this in (3.31) then results in the implied reaction function
it+1,t = ı¯t+1, (4.6)
where ı¯t+1 is defined by (2.33) and (2.34). Thus, the implied reaction function differs from that




t+1 is defined by (2.32).
4.1. Determinacy under the specific targeting rule
We have already observed that the specific targeting rule (4.2) and the implied reaction function
(4.6) is consistent with the equilibrium described by equations (2.30) and (2.29), and thus
consistent with continuation of the stationary optimal equilibrium if one starts from initial
conditions consistent with that equilibrium. However, it remains to be considered whether the
proposed policy commitment requires this outcome, under the assumption that the private sector
regards the commitment as fully credible.
When the reaction function defined by (2.33) and (2.38) is combined with the expectations
of (2.1) and (2.3), the resulting dynamic system can be written as (2.40), but with the column

























The eigenvalues are given by the roots of the characteristic equation, which can be written







) = 0. (4.8)
For f = 0, we have the same roots µ1 and µ2 as in the case of an exogenous process for the
interest rate (see section 2.4 above), and a third root µ3 = 0. Hence, by continuity, for small f we
again have indeterminacy, since we don’t have exactly two roots of modulus above unity. It can
be shown that an interval of positive values of f gives determinacy. The necessary and sufficient
conditions for determinacy of a dynamic system of this kind are derived in Woodford [47, Prop.
C.2, appendix to chapt. 4] and reproduced in appendix A. The interval of determinacy can be
written
min(f1, f2) < f < max(f1, f2), (4.9)











For the case f2 < f1, the corresponding eigenvalues fulfill µ3 < −1 < 0 < µ1 < 1 < 1/β < µ2.
Comparing (2.34), (4.9) and (4.10), it is clear that determinacy will at best result only in the
case of certain (not obviously plausible) parameter values. Once again, a possible interpretation
of this result is that it simply means that following the implied reaction function is not by itself
sufficient for determinacy. The central bank may need to supply additional information to the
private sector in order to facilitate the coordination of private-sector plans and expectations
upon the optimal equilibrium. Thus, ensuring determinacy may provide an additional argument
for transparency in central-bank decisionmaking.
As discussed above in section 3, it may be useful for the central bank to announce all or part
of its forecasts πt, xt and it. If these announcements are credible, in the sense that private-sector
plans and expectations agree with the announced forecasts, or even expect that others will, the
optimal equilibrium will result. Alternatively, the central bank may announce only the targeting
rule (4.1) that it intends to follow. If this announcement is credible, in the sense that people
expect the bank to succeed in bringing about the target condition, or at least expect others to
expect the condition to hold, the optimal equilibrium will again be the only outcome.
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4.2. A hybrid rule related to the specific targeting rule
Determinacy can again also be ensured in a more reliable way, by a hybrid rule involving an
intuitive out-of-equilbrium commitment. This can be done in a way directly related to the
declared specific targeting rule (4.2), so it is still very much in the spirit of a targeting rule.
Consider, the special case of (3.39) in which gπ =
κ
λ
gx = g > 0. Then the reaction function
implied by the hybrid procedure (3.39) and the specific targeting rule takes the form








where we have used the fact that central-bank forecasts satisfy (4.2) and (4.6) to obtain a
reduced-form variant of (3.39). This reaction function is such that the central bank first decides
on the interest rate consistent with achieving the specific targeting rule (4.2), corresponding to
it+1,t = ı¯t+1. If it, after having announced this interest-rate plan, it observes that private-sector
plans for inflation and the output gap, πt+1|t and xt+1|t deviate from the targeting rule (2.14), it
makes a further adjustment of the interest rate implemented in period t+1, in the proportion g
of the deviation from (2.14). (Note that, again, this is still a reaction function of the form (2.39),
though it no longer satisfies the information restriction assumed in (2.36), as a pure targeting
rule would.)
Let us now consider the determinacy of equilibrium under such a commitment. When (4.11)
is combined with the expectation of (2.1) and (2.3), the dynamic system can again be written










The corresponding characteristic equation can be written









g(µ2 − 2aµ+ 1
β
) = 0, (4.13)
where we have separated out the terms multiplied by g. We recognize that the quadratic equation
in the parenthesis multiplied by g is the same as the characteristic equation (2.19) examined
above, with roots c and 1/(βc) fulfilling 0 < c < 1 < 1/β < 1/(βc). Furthermore, the rest of
the characteristic equation is the same as the characteristic equation (4.8) examined above. If
f fulfills (4.9), we already have determinacy even if g ≡ 0. One can show that, regardless of
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whether f fulfills (4.9) or not, for any given value of f , there exists a value g¯(f) such that
g > g¯(f) (4.14)
is sufficient for determinacy. The value of g¯(f) is given by
g¯(f) ≡ max{g1(f), g2(f),min[g3(f), g4(f)]}, (4.15)
where g1(f), g2(f), g3(f) and g4(f) are the lowest values such that conditions (A.3) holds for
g > g1(f), condition (A.4) for g > g2(f), condition (A.5) for g > g3(f) and condition (A.7) for
g > g4(f), respectively. In some cases, the critical value is g1(f) ≡ 1− (1− β)f/κ. Preliminary
numerical analysis indicate that g¯(f) for most parameters need not be much different from 1 for
determinacy.
Since the optimal equilibrium is one possible equilibrium, the unique equilibrium must be
the optimal one. In equilibrium, (2.14) will be fulfilled. The commitment to deviate from ı¯t+1
in proportion to any deviation from (2.14) is an out-of-equilibrium commitment that will not be
noted in the equilibrium.
Thus, determinacy is possible in the case of a hybrid rule of this kind, regardless of the
values of the model’s structural parameters; if (4.9) is violated, one simply need to choose any
value for g that fulfills (4.14). This illustrates, again, the fact that a commitment to respond to
variables that are predetermined, and hence irrevocable, by the time that the bank responds to
them may nonetheless be desirable. In section 5, we now turn to a more general discussion of
what may be achieved through commitments of this kind.
4.3. A commitment to a an equivalent specific price-level targeting rule
As in Svensson [38], the specific targeting rule (4.2) can be expressed as an equivalent price-level
targeting rule. Let pt denote (the log of) the price level in period t (so πt ≡ pt − pt−1). First,
define a price-level target path in period t, p∗t ≡ {p∗t+τ,t}∞τ=0, according to
p∗t,t ≡ p∗t,t−1 + pt − pt|t−1, (4.16)
p∗t+τ,t ≡ p∗t,t. (4.17)
This price-level target path is conditional on a given one-period-ahead price-level target in period
t − 1, p∗t,t−1, to be determined. The target is adjusted by the unanticipated shock to the price
level in period t, pt − pt|t−1 = ut − ut|t−1, so that some base drift is allowed to occur.
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Second, consider the specific price-level targeting rule for period t,
pt+1|t − p∗t+1,t +
λ
κ
xt+1|t = 0. (4.18)
By first-differencing (4.18) (hence, assuming that (4.18) holds in period t − 1 and in all future
periods) and using (4.16) and (4.17), we see that (4.18) implies the consolidated first-order
condition (2.14). Third, if (4.18) holds for p∗t,t−1 in period t − 1, this together with (4.16) and
(4.17) implies




Thus if the price-level targeting rule (4.18) is initiated in a period t0 and holds for all
t ≥ t0, we can interpret (4.19) as determining the initial starting point p∗t0,t0 as a function of the
predetermined initial price level, pt0 , and the previous one-period-ahead private-sector output-
gap plan, xt0|t0−1, after which the future price-level target paths are determined by (4.16) and
(4.17).
Again, the central bank cannot directly insure that (4.18) is fulfilled, but it can produce
forecast paths that fulfill the corresponding specific targeting rule for the price-level and output-
gap forecast paths,
pt+τ,t − p∗t+τ,t +
λ
κ
xt+τ,t = 0 (4.20)
for τ ≥ 1. That is, the forecast of the price-level gap between the price level and the price-level
target should be proportional to the negative of the output-gap forecast.
In order to find the optimal price-level and output-gap forecasts, pt = {pt+τ,t}∞τ=1 and xt,
the central bank combines (4.20) with the aggregate-supply relation (3.1). This leads to the
difference equation







for τ ≥ 0, where
p˜t+τ,t ≡ pt+τ,t − p∗t+τ,t
denotes the price-level-gap forecast, the initial condition is
p˜t,t = pt − p∗t,t
≡ pt|t−1 − p∗t,t−1, (4.21)
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where we have used (4.16), and a is given by (2.17). Under the assumption (2.2), the solution is
p˜t+τ,t =
cρτ





c− ρ ut + c
τ p˜t,t


















and that the inflation forecast is given by
πt+τ,t =
ρcρτ




(1− ρ)ρτ−1 − (1− c)cτ−1
c− ρ ut − (1− c)c
τ−1p˜t,t.
Using this in (3.2) to find the optimal instrument rate decision in period t, it+1,t, gives




1− βρc(c+ ρ− 1)ut + f˜ p˜t,t, (4.22)
where we have assumed (2.4) and where
f˜ ≡ − κ
λ
f ≡ κ− λσ
λσ
(1− c)c. (4.23)
Note that there is a relatively close relation between optimal inflation targeting under commit-
ment and price-level targeting under discretion, previously discussed by Svensson [37], Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler [4], Svensson and Woodford [39, section 5.2], Vestin [42] and Smets [31].
Note also that (4.21) and (4.22) imply that the instrument responds to the endogenous
variable pt|t−1 and exogenous shocks. This has implications for the determinacy of equilibrium.
When the implied reaction function defined by (4.22) is combined with the expectations of (2.1)
and (2.3), the resulting dynamic system can be written as (2.40), but with the column vectors
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The eigenvalues are given by the roots of the characteristic equation, which can be written









For f˜ = 0, we have the same roots 0 < µ1 < 1 < 1/β < µ2 as in the case of an exogenous
process for the interest rate (see section 2.4 above), and a third root µ3 = 1. One can show that
a sufficient condition for determinacy is
0 < f˜ < f˜2, (4.24)
where




(Conditions (A.3) and (A.5) impliy f˜ > 0 and f˜ < f˜2, respectively, and condition (A.7) is always
fulfilled.) Comparing (4.9), (4.10) and (4.23)—(4.25), we see that the determinacy conditions for
the specific price-level targeting rule (4.20) are different from those for the specific (inflation)
targeting rule (4.2). But once again, they need not be fulfilled for all reasonable parameter
values.
A hybrid price-level targeting rule of the form
it+1 = ı˜t+1 + g(pt+1|t − p∗t+1,t + λxt+1|t)
can also be considered, with a corresponding condition on g for determinacy.
5. Commitment to an explicit instrument rule
As a final possibility, we now consider monetary policy procedures that involve commitment to
the achievement of a rule that links the bank’s instrument to other variables that are all either
exogenous or predetermined at the time that the instrument must be set. Such an explicit
instrument rule represents a possible decision procedure that requires no explicit consideration
of either forecasts or optimization problems for its implementation. A commitment of this highly
specific kind would have the advantage of making private-sector forecasting of future policy, and
monitoring of the degree to which the central bank fulfills its commitment, quite straightforward.
It also makes it easy to incorporate into the policy rule the sort of history-dependence that is
necessary to achieve the optimal equilibrium, and the sort of dependence upon the realized
paths of endogenous variables that is necessary in order for equilibrium to be determinate. A
rule of this kind with appropriately chosen coefficients may result in a unique non-explosive
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rational-expectations equilibrium in which the responses to all shocks are optimal; indeed, in
the absence of restrictions upon the central bank’s information set, there will in general be a
large multiplicity of instrument rules that are equally desirable in this regard.43
Here we are concerned in particular with whether there are explicit instrument rules that
lead to a desirable equilibrium and that also have a relatively transparent relation to the central
bank’s objective. One respect in which this may be true is that the rule may make the instrument
a function solely of the paths of target variables.44 This is certainly the point of the well-
known proposal of Taylor [40], under which the instrument rate is made a simple function of
current measures of inflation and the output gap. However, simply specifying that policy should
respond to any and all deviations of target variables from their (constant) target levels does not
necessarily make sense, given that in general complete stabilization of all target variables around
the target values will not be feasible even in principle. A more sophisticated approach would
instead respond to deviations from the particular pattern of fluctuations in the target variables
that is optimal.
It is already clear that one type of explicit instrument rule that is definitely not desirable
is a commitment to make the nominal interest rate the particular function i∗t+1 in (2.32) of
the history of disturbances that is associated with the “timeless” optimal equilibrium. For a
policy rule of this kind makes the nominal interest rate evolve exogenously, with no feedback
from the actual realizations of the endogenous variables; and as we have discussed above in
section 2.4, any such rule results in indeterminacy. Indeed, commitment to this instrument rule
would be equivalent to commitment to the modified dynamic-optimizing procedure described
earlier, which as we saw leads to indeterminacy. In the case of a simple commitment to the
implied reaction function (2.32), the absence of any possibility of response to private-sector
expectations, and of any opportunity for the central bank to persuade the private sector of its
own forecasts, is all the clearer. Thus, the equilibrium paths of inflation and output will not be
uniquely determined in this case. Rules in the spirit of the Taylor rule, that specify a response
to fluctuations in endogenous variables, are clearly preferable from a determinacy point of view
(although, if exactly of the form suggested by Taylor [40], they would not be optimal for the
economy considered here).
One way of characterizing undesirable fluctuations in the target variables, that has the
43 See Woodford [44] for further discussion of this point.
44 Of course, there is no general reason to expect that an optimal policy rule should involve responses only to
information that is revealed by the history of the target variables, as is stressed in Svensson [36] and [38].
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advantages of not requiring explicit reference to the particular exogenous shocks that have
occurred, and of being robust to alternative assumed shock processes, is to identify them with
failures to satisfy the consolidated first-order condition (2.14), the specific targeting rule that
characterizes the optimal equilibrium. A commitment to “make the condition hold” each period
is not a possible explicit instrument rule; in the bank’s period-t+ 1 decision cycle, it is already
a matter of fact whether (2.14) has held or not, whereas in its period-t decision cycle, the
endogenous variables πt+1|t and xt+1|t are not yet observable (as they will depend upon the
bank’s period-t decision). Nonetheless, the central bank can commit itself to move its instrument
in response to whether the first-order condition has been satisfied.
A simple example of such a rule would be








where again g > 0 is a given response coefficient. Such a commitment is similar to a Taylor-type
instrument rule, in which the bank responds to the change in the output gap, rather than its
current level, as in the characterizations of Fed policy during the Volcker period proposed by
Judd and Rudebusch [13] and Orphanides [25]. It is also necessary, of course, to respond to
the forecastable components of inflation and the output gap, rather than to the realized values
of these variables, in order for the instrument rule to be fully explicit.45 Note that this rule is
once again one that makes the central bank’s action perfectly forecastable one period in advance
(it+1 = it+1|t), even though there is no advance announcement of the instrument setting (since
the central bank does not yet observe πt+1|t and xt+1|t during its period-t decision cycle).
What kind of equilibrium would result from credible commitment to such a policy? Taking
expectations of (2.1), (2.3), and (5.1) conditional upon public information in period t, and
eliminating the variable it+1|t, one obtains a system of difference equations that can again be
written in the form (2.40), with the definition of the vectors zt and s˜t as in (4.7) and with the









(again we do not need the details of the matrix N).
45 Taylor’s formulation of his proposal is criticized by McCallum [24] on exactly this point. Note that, if we
were to assume that both inflation and output are completely predetermined, as in the analysis of Rotemberg
and Woodford [27] and [28], rule (5.1) can be expressed in terms of a direct response to the period t+1 inflation
rate and output gap, like the policy rules analyzed in those papers.
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As usual, determinacy requires that M have exactly two eigenvalues with modulus greater
than one, corresponding to the two non-predetermined elements of zt. Whether this is true
depends upon the size of the response coefficient g. The matrix M above is equal to that in
(4.12) when f = 0. It follows that the characteristic equation is the same as (4.14) when f = 0.
Thus, the condition for determinacy is g > g¯(0).
It follows that as long as g > g¯(0), there is a unique bounded solution for zt, which depends
solely upon the predetermined variable xt|t−1 and expectations in period t regarding the future
paths of the exogenous disturbances. In the case that both disturbances are AR(1) processes,
(2.2) and (2.4), this solution is one in which both πt+1|t and xt+1|t are linear functions of xt|t−1,
ut and r
n
t . The next question is the extent to which this equilibrium coincides with the optimal
one. In fact, we know that it cannot coincide exactly with the optimal one (more precisely:
even if we start from initial conditions consistent with the stationary optimal equilibrium, the
equilibrium resulting from a commitment to (5.1) will not continue that optimal equilibrium).
This is because we have already seen that the stationary optimal equilibrium requires that the
term in brackets in (5.1) be zero at all times, while it also requires that it+1 = i
∗
t+1 at all times,
a quantity that, by (2.32), is generally different from r¯.
On the other hand, the determinate equilibrium associated with rule (5.1) may approximate
an optimal equilibrium; in particular, one can show that as g is made sufficiently large, the
approximation to the optimal equilibrium becomes arbitrarily close. (Specifically, one can show
that in the limit as g → + ∞, this equilibrium approaches the one described by (2.21) and
(2.23) for each period, which is to say, the unique equilibrium in which condition (2.14) holds
each period.) However, such a policy prescription is unappealing, because of the possibility that
small amounts of noise in the bank’s measurement of the forecastable components of the goal
variables would lead in practice to highly volatile interest rates.46
Alternatively, we can make the instrument rule (5.1) consistent with the stationary optimal











This is now a rule that is consistent with the stationary optimal equilibrium, regardless of
46 Here we presume that the central bank’s measurement error does not become apparent to the private sector,
and so cannot affect private sector forecasts or behavior, until after the quantities in the square brackets in (5.1)
have been determined. Note that the central bank’s error need not become apparent to the private sector until
the period t+1 interest rate is revealed, whereas the forecasts to which the central bank responds in setting it+1
are all determined by the private sector in period t. For further discussion of the undesirability of this approach
to stabilization, see Bernanke and Woodford [2].
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the value of g. Because the added term is an exogenous random process, the determinacy
calculations remain the same as above, and we again find that for g > g¯(0), equilibrium is
determinate. Since we already know that the optimal equilibrium is consistent with (5.2), it
follows from determinacy that the unique bounded equilibrium is an optimal one.
As yet another alternative, we could modify (5.1) by adding an endogenous term that renders
the rule consistent with the stationary optimal equilibrium, namely








where once again ı¯t+1 is defined by (2.33). This is identical to the reaction function (4.11)
implied by the hybrid procedure considered above in section 4.2, though here we contemplate
a direct commitment to bring about this reaction function as an explicit instrument rule. The
determinacy analysis is the same as in the previous section. Thus, for g > g¯(f), equilibrium is
determinate, and the unique bounded equilibrium is an optimal one.
These two examples illustrate the possibility of achieving the optimal equilibrium as a deter-
minate outcome through commitment to an explicit instrument rule with bounded coefficients.
They also illustrate an important general point. This is that the mere fact that the target
variables are predetermined in the short run, and so not able to be affected by current central
bank decisions, does not imply that the only effective procedure must be a forward-looking one,
that aims to have a certain effect upon the future paths of the target variables. Instead, as long
as the private sector is forward-looking and the central bank’s policy rule can be made credi-
ble, committing to respond in a purely backward-looking way to past deviations of the target
variables from their desired path can be an effective way of reducing the size of those deviations
in equilibrium. The anticipation that the central will later respond in this way is enough to
achieve the desired effect, and indeed, in a model like that assumed here, it is only the private
sector’s expectations regarding future policy that can have any effect on the evolution of the
target variables at all.
This seems an important principle to keep in mind in choosing a policy rule, especially insofar
as the determinacy of equilibrium is a concern. However, the explicit instrument rules proposed
above remain unattractive on grounds of robustness. Note that a suitable specification of either
the targeting rule (4.1) or the hybrid rule (4.11) depends only upon the slope coefficient κ of the
aggregate supply relation, and not upon other coefficients of the bank’s model of the economy
or any details of the assumed specification of the exogenous shock processes. Instead the term
i∗t+1 in (5.2) depends also upon the slope coefficient σ of the model’s IS relation, and upon the
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parameters of the exogenous shock processes (for instance, in the AR(1) specification assumed in
(2.32), upon the parameters ρ and ω). The same is true of the term ı¯t+1 in (5.3). The presence
of these terms also requires that one sacrifice one of the obvious advantages of simple instrument
rules like the “Taylor rule”, which is ease of communication of the nature of the commitment
to the general public. When the instrument rule involves reference to responses to exogenous
disturbances (rather than simply to goal variables, that are better understood by the public,
and are publicly reported), there is no longer any particular advantage of this approach in terms
of transparency.
The hybrid procedure defined by (4.11) is more attractive in both of these last regards. For
that specification of the policy commitment depended only upon the specific value of κ, yet (in
the case that the specific model assumed above is used) it implied an identical reaction function
as the instrument rule (5.3). It was also a specification that required no explicit reference to the
exogenous disturbances. Such a hybrid approach thus combines several of the most attractive
features of a specific targeting rule and of an explicit instrument rule.
6. Concluding remarks
We now offer a few remarks on the degree to which the various decision procedures discussed
above satisfy the desiderata for a desirable monetary policy rule mentioned in the introduction.
Our first and most important criterion, of course, is consistency of the policy rule with the
stationary optimal equilibrium characterized in section 2. As we have seen, the most naive
approach to inflation-forecast targeting–a forecast-based discretionary optimizing procedure
aimed at minimization of the true social loss function–fails to have this property. However,
we have shown that there are many different ways in which one could introduce the sort of
history-dependence required for consistency with the optimal equilibrium. Possible methods
include modification of the loss function that the forecast-based optimizing procedure seeks to
minimize, commitment to a specific targeting rule such as (4.1), commitment to an instrument
rule such as (5.2) or (5.3), or commitment to a hybrid procedure such as (3.39) or (4.11). Any
of these approaches would be equally satisfactory from the point of view of consistency with the
optimal equilibrium, assuming credibility of the bank’s commitment to the rule in question.
Our second criterion was determinacy of equilibrium under the policy rule, so that one could
count on the optimal equilibrium being the one which should result from a correct understanding
of the central bank’s commitment on the part of the private sector. This turned out to be
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a problem for the procedure discussed in section 3.5, directed toward the minimization of a
modified loss function, the “commitment to continuity and predictability.” In the case of our
present model, such a procedure results in indeterminacy for all possible values of the model
parameters. And more generally, because such a procedure necessarily corresponds to an implied
reaction function involving no dependence upon lagged endogenous variables except insofar as
these are relevant to forecasts of the future evolution of the target variables, such rules are less
likely to involve the dependence upon lagged endogenous variables that is necessary in order to
exclude self-fulfilling expectations.
This problem may be mitigated by a sufficient degree of transparency of the bank’s decision
procedure, as this may facilitate the coordination of private-sector expectations upon the paths
forecasted by the central bank. But this would still seem to be a weakness of our highest-level
approach to the specification of a policy rule, relative to lower-level specifications that make
the bank’s decisions dependent upon lagged endogenous variables for reasons unrelated to their
effect upon the bank’s forecasts.
However, a way to achieve determinacy is to amend the general targeting procedure with
a commitment to a particular instrument-rate response by the central bank, if the private-
sector plans of inflation and the output gap deviate from the central bank’s forecast. This is
the hybrid rule discussed in section 3.6 and represented by equation (3.40). Since this is an
out-of-equilibrium commitment, it will not have any observable consequences in equilibrium.
A specific targeting rule can introduce additional dependence upon lagged endogenous vari-
ables, through commitment to a target criterion that depends upon past as well as future paths
of the target variables. However, in the case of the simple targeting rule (4.1), indeterminacy
is likely still to be a problem for reasonable parameter values. Achieving determinacy in this
way may require an even greater degree of dependence of the target criterion upon the past
history of the target variables. Again, one way to achieve determinacy is to amend the specific
targeting rule with a commitment to a particular out-of-equilibrium instrument-rate response
by the central bank, if the specific targeting rule is violated. A hybrid rule that serves this
purpose has been discussed in section 4.2 and displayed in equation (4.11).
An alternative approach, that can easily result in a determinate equilibrium that is also
optimal from our timeless perspective, is commitment to an explicit instrument rule that requires
the central bank to respond to deviations of the target variables from a target criterion which
they should satisfy in an optimal equilibrium. This is illustrated by the explicit instrument rules
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(5.2) and (5.3), but the hybrid rules mentioned above works equally well in this regard.
However, it should be stressed, that the magnitude of the determinacy problems above may
be exaggerated by the extremely forward-looking character of the model assumed here, in which
no lagged endogenous variables are relevant to the determination of current and future values
of the target variables, except insofar as such dependence is introduced through the monetary
policy rule. A consideration of the extent to which the decision procedures of the kind we
have considered would still face indeterminacy problems in a more complex, and possibly more
realistic, model with sources of intrinsic inertia in the endogenous variables remains a topic for
further research.
There remain two further criteria for comparison of our candidate policies. As noted in
the introduction, we prefer approaches to monetary policy in which the connection between
the central bank’s decision process and its ultimate objectives is as transparent as possible.
From this point of view, our highest-level policy specifications, in terms of a procedure that
aims to minimize a specified loss function, are most suitable. The most transparent procedure
would be the naive approach of discretionary minimization of the social loss function; but this
procedure, as we have seen, is inconsistent with an optimal equilibrium. Minimizing a modified
loss function, the commitment to continuity and credibility discussed in section 3.5, is somewhat
less transparent, although the idea of taking into account the shadow cost of the previous central-
bank forecasts and private-sector expectations is arguably a direct consequence of the desire to
minimize the social loss function, once the nature of the bank’s optimization problem is properly
understood. Such concerns are also arguably already present in the thinking and rhetoric of
actual inflation-targeting central banks, given its emphasis on continuity and predictability (see,
for instance, King [17]). However, in a more complex model with a greater number of forward-
looking variables, this approach would imply that the Lagrange multipliers of all of the (relevant)
forward-looking variables would need to be recorded and taken into account in modifying the
period loss function. This would make the approach far less transparent, and perhaps less
practical as well.
The specific targeting rule discussed in section 4 and described by equation (2.14), implying
that the expected deviation between inflation and the inflation target should be proportional to
the decrease in the predictable component of the output gap, is simple, but somewhat less intu-
itive, and for that reason less transparently related to underlying policy goals.47 The equivalent
47 In at least some very simple models, a similar specific targeting rule derived from the first-order conditions
that characterize the optimal equilibrium is more intuitive, and indeed more similar to the sort of intuitive
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price-level targeting rule for the forward-looking model discussed in section 4.3 is arguably more
intuitive, though. And in any event, because such a rule is still specified in terms of the desired
behavior of the target variables, it scores better on this criterion than would instrument rules
such as (5.2) and (5.3). The same is true of the hybrid variant of this procedure described by
(4.11).
Because explicit instrument rules are formulated as rules of central-bank conduct that hap-
pen, generally for relatively indirect reasons, to have desirable consequences if anticipated by
the private sector, rather than as descriptions of what the bank is trying to achieve, they rate
lowest on the criterion of transparency. A rule such as (5.1), however, is more transparently
related to the goals of policy than many other instrument rules would be, insofar as it prescribes
response to failure of the target variables to satisfy a target criterion (indeed, the same criterion
as is the basis for the specific targeting rule (2.14)). However, as we have seen, (5.1) in its
simplest form is not consistent with the optimal equilibrium. Modified instrument rules such as
(5.2) and (5.3), that are consistent with optimality, involve fairly complex functions of lagged
disturbances or endogenous variables that are clearly not related to the goals of policy in any
transparent way.
Our final criterion is the robustness of the alternative monetary-policy procedures to mod-
ifications of the assumed model of the economy. The general topic of robustness is beyond the
scope of this study, but our results here do allow us to comment upon the sensitivity of the
various specifications to changes in parameters while assuming the same basic model structure.
Clearly, the higher-order policy specifications are more robust to model perturbations. Our
general approach in section 3.5 of modifying the loss function so as to make a discretionary
optimizing procedure consistent with the optimal equilibrium is not dependent upon the details
of the bank’s model of the economy at all. Only the identification of the relevant forward-
looking variables and their associated Lagrange multipliers is at all model-dependent; nothing
about the specification would need to be changed as a result of changes in model parameters
that maintained the same basic form of equations (2.1) and (2.3), or changes in the assumed
specification of the exogenous disturbance processes.
The specific targeting rule (2.14) is less robust than this, but it still depends only upon the
slope coefficient κ of the aggregate-supply relation. The targeting rule is independent of the
nature and number of the exogenous disturbances in the aggregate-supply equation. And as
forecast-targeting rules followed by actual inflation-targeting central banks; see Svensson [33].
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long as there is no weight on interest-rate stabilization or smoothing in the loss function, the
targeting rule is completely independent of both the form of the IS equation and the nature
of its disturbances. Thus, the targeting rule arising in this model is quite robust to a number
of model perturbations. This supports the conjecture arising in the backward-looking model of
Svensson [33] that targeting rules are likely to be more robust than instrument rules.48 The
hybrid variant of this rule (3.39) is equally robust.
The instrument rules (5.2) and (5.3) are the least robust, since they depend on all of the pa-
rameters of the model and are not robust to any perturbations–except changes in the variances
of the iid shocks, due to the certainty-equivalence that holds in a linear model with a quadratic
loss function.
Overall, we find that each of our general classes of policy specifications contains specifica-
tions that incorporate the kind of history-dependence required for consistency with the optimal
equilibrium. The lower-level specifications are most advantageous from the point of view of
ensuring determinacy, whereas to the contrary, we find that the higher-level specifications are
most advantageous from the standpoints of transparency and robustness. An intermediate-level
policy specification, involving commitment to a specific targeting rule, may be the best overall
compromise among these competing concerns. The hybrid procedure described in section 4.2
is perhaps the most attractive of the alternatives reviewed here, as it allows one to ensure de-
terminacy regardless of the model parameters, while at the same time being quite robust, and
retaining a more transparent relation to the goals of policy than is possible in the case of an
explicit instrument rule.
48 Svensson [38] takes this argument further, and shows that specific targeting rules are robust to the unavoidable
use of judgment in practical monetary policy. Giannoni and Woodford [11] show how robust targeting rules can
be computed for a general class of linear-quadratic policy problems.
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A. The necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy
Consider a system of difference equations of the form,
zt+1|t =Mzt +Ns˜t,
where zt denotes a vector of three endogenous variables, two of which are forward-looking and
one of which is predetermined, s˜t denotes a vector of exogenous variables, and M and N are
matrices of appropriate dimension. The solution to this system is determinate if and only if
the matrix M has one eigenvalue with modulus less than one and two eigenvalues with modulus
greater than one.
The characteristic equation of the system will be cubic and can be written
µ3 + a2µ
2 + a1µ+ a0 = 0.
Woodford [47, Prop. C.2, appendix to chapter 4] shows that the solution to the system is
determinate if and only if the coefficients of the characteristic equation fulfill
either (case I)
1 + a2 + a1 + a0 < 0 and (A.1)
−1 + a2 − a1 + a0 > 0; (A.2)
or (case II)and
1 + a2 + a1 + a0 > 0, (A.3)
−1 + a2 − a1 + a0 < 0 and (A.4)
a20 − a0a2 + a1 − 1 > 0; (A.5)
or (case III) (A.3) and (A.4) hold, together with
a20 − a0a2 + a1 − 1 < 0 and (A.6)
|a2| > 3. (A.7)
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